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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the impact of bank revenue diversification on the performance of 
banks in an emerging economy. Using a unique dataset with detailed information on non-
interest income, our findings show that, conversely to studies on Western economies, a shift 
towards non-interest activities increases bank profits and risk-adjusted profits particularly 
when they are more involved in trading in government securities. Our results also indicate 
that foreign banks benefit more from such a shift than their domestic counterparts. Moreover, 
we account for the institutional and regulatory environment advocating loans to SMEs and 
find that higher involvement in non-interest activities is only beneficial for banks with low 
exposures to SMEs. Our findings have important policy implications in terms of achieving 
optimal diversification and lower risk exposure, which might conflict with policies aiming to 
promote SME lending.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the last three decades, the financial industry in developed as well as in developing 
countries has experienced major changes. Deregulation and increased competition has led 
banks to expand their activities and to develop new lines of businesses beside their traditional 
interest activities. Banks have diversified their income sources by performing new activities, 
such as underwriting and trading securities, brokerage and investment banking and other 
activities, which generate non-interest income. The implications of such changes on bank 
performance, i.e. profitability and risk, have been broadly addressed in the literature but no 
consensus has been reached at this stage. Most studies find that non-interest activities are 
often associated with profitability gains but also higher risk because of their unstable nature. 
By investigating the US banking industry, Stiroh (2004a and 2004b), Stiroh (2006) and Stiroh 
and Rumble (2006) find that a higher share of non-interest income positively affects the 
volatility of bank returns inducing higher risk. Consistent with US studies, Lepetit et al. 
(2008a) show that banks that are more reliant on non-interest activities exhibit higher default 
risk than banks which mainly supply loans. This positive link mainly holds for small banks 
and is essentially driven by commission and fee activities. Specifically, a higher share of 
trading activities is not associated in their study with higher risk and for small banks it implies, 
in some cases, lower asset and default risks. Mercieca et al. (2007) find that small European 
banks do not benefit from diversification. Higher non-interest income shares are associated 
with lower profitability and increased risk implying lower risk-adjusted profits. Furthermore, 
they find trading activities to be both risky and unprofitable. Conversely, analyzing Italian 
banks, Chiorazzo et al. (2008) find that income diversification improves the risk/return trade-
off. Such diversification gains are stronger for large banks.  
Whereas the case of developed countries (US and Europe) is well documented in the 
empirical literature, very few papers focus on emerging countries. In a cross-country study 
conducted for a sample of listed banks from 11 emerging countries, Sanya and Wolfe (2011) 
find that diversification between interest and non-interest activities as well as within both 
types of activities increases profitability and reduces bank insolvency risk. Berger et al. 
(2010) examine the case of the Chinese banking industry and find evidence of a 
diversification discount 1 , which is stronger for domestic banks than for foreign banks, 
suggesting that different ownership structures induce different effects of diversification on 
bank valuation. Focusing on the Mexican banking system, Maudos and Solis (2009) highlight 
                                                          
1
 Their diversification discount indicators are profit premiums and cost discounts. They are measured as the difference between the predicted 
profits (respectively the predicted cost) between the observed diversified bank and a hypothetical quasi-focused bank. 
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the existence of a negative relationship between banks' interest margin and non-interest 
income. Their findings are consistent with the results obtained for European banks by Lepetit 
et al. (2008b) indicating possible cross-subsidization of non-interest activities with traditional 
intermediation activities where banks use loans as a loss leader.   
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the scarce literature dedicated to the 
impact of diversification on bank profitability and risk in the case of emerging and developing 
countries. As financial markets are less mature in such countries than in developed countries, 
banks play a crucial role in the financing of the private sector and specifically for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). As discussed in the Financial Access 2010 Report provided by 
the IFC, access to finance by SMEs is one of the main policy issues for developing countries 
and specific regulations encouraging banks to lend to priority sectors, including SMEs, are 
implemented in some emerging countries like Afghanistan, India, the Philippines and 
Pakistan. By imposing constraints on bank lending behavior, such regulations may influence 
how banks may efficiently allocate scarce financial resources. Another important issue for 
emerging and developing countries is the role of corporate ownership and governance in 
affecting bank behavior. As reported by De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007), two main trends 
in bank ownership structure in emerging countries can be highlighted over the 1993-2004 
period. While foreign ownership substantially increased, state-ownership remained stable and 
still tends to increase in some group of countries. Several papers have investigated the effect 
of a higher foreign presence in local banking markets. Foreign bank entry is generally found 
to positively impact competition and, in some cases, improve the efficiency of the local 
banking system (Claessens et al., 2001; Lensink and Hermes, 2003). However, studies 
regarding credit availability provide mixed results. While for some authors, foreign bank 
entry reduces credit constraints (Clarke et al., (2006)), others such as Detragiache et al. (2008) 
and Gormley (2010) find that foreign bank entry does not necessarily improve access to 
finance for local firms. Meanwhile, in terms of government ownership of banks, an abundant 
theoretical literature stresses its negative effect in terms of efficiency and risk (Shleifer, 1998; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
In order to assess the bank diversification/profitability and risk nexus in emerging 
economies, we focus on the case of the Philippines. Focusing on a single country enables us 
to analyze the effects of diversification within a uniform environment and extend the paper of 
Sanya and Wolfe (2011) by going deeper into the investigation, using a detailed breakdown of 
non-interest income of Philippine banks. Specifically, our data allow us to distinguish 
traditional from non-traditional sources of non-interest income, which may have different 
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effects on bank performance. We also take into account banks’ ownership type in assessing 
bank profitability and risk as the Philippine banking system has experienced foreign bank 
entry after the financial liberalization in the early 90s and is also characterized by the presence 
of some state-owned banks. Furthermore, we consider a specific regulation on Philippine 
banks, which is also implemented in several emerging economies. Philippine banks are 
required to set aside at least 6% and 2% of their loan portfolio to small and medium 
enterprises, respectively. Other ways to comply, however, are present, which include the 
purchase of government notes, securities and negotiable instruments offered by the Small 
Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC)2. These may be the best alternatives, 
especially for banks that have underdeveloped lending technologies in financing small 
businesses. To our knowledge, this is the first study of bank diversification in an emerging 
economy that looks into this regulatory aspect3. This question is of particular interest for 
emerging countries where small business lending is a crucial issue. Our study does not aim to 
provide a direct assessment of the effect of such SME financing regulation on bank 
diversification behavior as data on individual bank loan portfolio disaggregated according to 
the size of borrowing firms are not available. Nevertheless, it provides insights on the impact 
of mandated credit programs to SMEs on the benefits or drawbacks of an increase in bank 
income diversification in terms of profitability and risk.   
We conduct our empirical investigation over the 1999-2005 period using a sample of 39 
universal and commercial banks in the Philippines with a very detailed breakdown of annual 
data on income structure provided by the Central Bank of the Philippines. This allows us to 
deeply analyze bank diversification behavior by examining the effect on profitability and risk 
not only of the main components of non-interest income (fee-based, trading and other non-
interest income) but also by considering a detailed categorization of such components. 
Estimations are also conducted according to bank ownership profiles that may cause 
divergence in the diversification-profit/risk relation. In extension, we also examine the effect 
of income diversification for a specific category of banks in the Philippines, universal banks, 
whose additional functions include engagement in the underwriting of securities of other 
corporations4.  
Our results indicate that income diversification and a shift towards non-interest income 
has a positive influence on the profitability and risk-adjusted profitability of Philippine banks. 
                                                          
2
 Republic Act No. 6977, Section 13. Mandatory Allocation of Credit Resources of Small and Medium Enterprises. 
3
 Wolfe and Sanya (2011) find that a higher banking freedom and better investor protection are associated with higher profitability. 
However, they do not explicitly explore the effect of such regulations on the risk implications of increased bank diversification.  
4Republic Act 8791; Presidential Decree No. 129.! 
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The impact, however, is stronger for foreign banks than domestic banks. Moreover, we find 
that the gains from income diversification are mainly derived from an increase in the 
involvement in non-traditional, non-interest generating activities of banks, such as trading 
securities. We attribute our results, which are in contrast with the findings of several US 
banking studies to differences in terms of income structure. Ninety percent of fee-based 
income in the Philippines is considered traditional, and fee-based income growth is strongly 
correlated with net interest income. On the other hand, trading income comprises almost half 
of non-interest income, compared with less than 10% in US banks. Standard portfolio theory 
predicts that, a shift towards trading activities, which are the least correlated with traditional 
intermediation activities, would lead to larger benefits from diversification. In contrast with 
what is observed in the US, we do not find evidence that trading income’s volatility cancels 
out its positive impact on profitability. Overall, our main result is consistent with Sanya and 
Wolfe (2011), who find revenue diversification to be beneficial for emerging economies.  
Our findings also show that banks that are lending less to SMEs are the beneficiaries of 
increased profits from a shift towards non-interest activities, implying possible high switching 
costs from lending to non-lending activities for banks that specialize in relationship lending. 
Banks, which are in a better position to diversify their income portfolio away from interest-
generating activities, are more likely to alternatively comply with the mandated credit 
program (i.e. through the purchase of SBGCF liability instruments). For these banks, 
reallocating resources away from profitable non-interest income generating activities to the 
less familiar SME market may be very costly, which may discourage compliance by directly 
lending to SMEs. Finally, we also investigate a subsample of universal banks and find that 
higher involvement in investment house activities is associated with higher risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
variables used in our study and presents recent trends in the income structure of the Philippine 
banking industry. Section 3 describes the hypotheses tested, the method and the econometric 
specifications. Section 4 provides the results of our estimations while section 5 goes deeper 
by investigating further issues. Section 6 presents the robustness checks and Section 7 
summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Data and Variables, Descriptive Statistics and Trends in the Philippine Banking 
Industry 
The nature and structure of banks in emerging economies has been changing in the past 
decades because of several factors. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) cites four global forces of 
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change responsible for shaping the emerging economies’ banking industries – technological 
innovation, deregulation of financial services, changes in corporate behavior and the crises 
that struck Asia and Latin America in the 90s. 
The introduction of universal banking in 1980 and the financial liberalization that 
opened up the economy to international competition have paved way to the changes in the 
way Philippine banks do business. Growing competition over the period in the Philippine 
banking market has provided incentives for commercial banks to diversify their activities and 
to increase the share of non-interest activities (Gochoco-Bautista (1999)). Banks have been 
providing a broader array of financial services, which include not only the extension of loans 
but also underwriting and distributing securities, sale of investments, online banking and 
commission and fee activities5. In the Philippines, banks are classified in six main categories6: 
universal banks, commercial banks, thrift and savings banks, rural banks, cooperative banks 
and Islamic banks. In 2005, universal and commercial banks alone comprise 89.29%, 89.47% 
and 90% 7  of the total assets, deposit liabilities and loans and investments outstanding, 
respectively of the entire Philippine banking system. Universal banks have the authority to 
exercise, in addition to the functions authorized for a commercial bank8, the powers of an 
investment house9. These figures show that universal and commercial banks are the primary 
lenders to both households and institutions in the country. Their behavior generally shapes 
that of the banking system and impacts the economy.  
2.1 Data Collection and Sample Selection 
The sample used in this study includes 39 universal and commercial banks in the 
Philippines from 1999 to 2005. The amendment10 of the manual of accounts and the Central 
Bank’s reportorial requirements for banks implemented in 2006 does not allow us to have the 
same income categorizations after 2006. We construct our sample using two criteria: (1) 
banks must have at least data for three years and, (2) the gross income components must be 
                                                          
5
 Over the past twenty years, non-interest income has grown over 700% (200% more than the growth rate in interest income). 
6
 The General Banking Law of 2000 (Republic Act No. 8791). 
7
 Author’s computations from the Banking Statistics published in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas website. 
8
 Article II- Operations of Commercial Banks  (Republic Act No.8791). A commercial bank shall have, in addition to the general powers 
incident to corporations, all such powers as may be necessary to carry on the business of commercial banking, such as accepting drafts and 
issuing letters of credit; discounting and negotiating pormissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidence of debt; accepting or 
creating demand deposits; receiving other types of deposits and deposit substitutes; buying and selling foreing exchange and gold or silver 
bullion; acquiring marketable bonds and other debt securities; and extending credit, subject to such rules as the Monetary Board may 
promulgate.  
9
 From the Omnibus Rules and Regulations for Investment Houses and Universal banks registered as underwriters of securities, an 
investment house is defined as any enterprise which primarily engages, whether regularly or on an isolated basis, in underwriting securities 
of another person or enterprise, including securities of the Government or its instrumentalities.  
10
 Circular No. 512. Amendment of the Manual of Accounts and BSP Reportorial Requirements for Banks. The Financial Reporting Package 
(FRP) is designed to align the Manual of Accounts and the BSP Reportorial requirements with the provisions of the Philippine Financial 
Reporting Standards (PFRS) and Philippine Accounting Standards (PAS). The new BSP reportorial requirements shall become effective 
starting with the 31 December 2006 month-end/quarter-end reports. 
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non-negative. The first criterion is set to confine the panel regressions on banks with 
sufficient number of observations. Meanwhile, the second criterion ensures that the 
diversification measures, particularly the indices and income shares are bounded from 0 to 1. 
We also apply several measures to check the presence of outliers and influential 
observations11. We also exclude banks that were merged and/or were acquired during the 
period 12 . We hence end up with an unbalanced panel consisting of 39 banks and 218 
observations.  
Our sample of banks represents 86.81%13 of the Philippine banking system and 96.3% 
of the universal and commercial banking system in terms of total assets14. 
The whole sample consists of 23 domestic and 16 foreign banks15, and 16 listed and 23 
non-listed entities. In terms of asset size, we identify 8 large banks (Average Asset > 140 
billion pesos), 13 medium-sized (30 billion pesos < Average Asset < 120 billion pesos) and 
18 small ones (Average Asset < 30 billion pesos). Bank classifications in terms of size are 
defined from an examination of the distribution of banks both in terms of their average assets 
over the period of the study and bank asset distribution by their yearly amounts. We note that 
most of the smaller banks in the sample are foreign-owned, branches or subsidiaries of 
foreign banks and that the largest banks are dominantly domestic banks. Among the 8 large 
banks, 2 are government banks. Excluding the state banks, our sample of domestic banks is 
composed of 12 universal banks and 9 commercial banks.  
Balance sheet and net income information are obtained from the Data Center of the 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and its website on an annual basis16. Our dataset provides us a 
detailed breakdown of operating income and its components. This enables us to carry out an 
in depth study on non-interest income, its main components – fee-based, trading and other 
non-interest income, and their respective disaggregation. Fee-based and trading activities 
include respectively, bank commissions, service charges/fees and other commissions and 
                                                          
11
 Aside from graphically looking at box plots and scatter plots to identify outliers, we confirm these outliers by computing the DFBETA and 
leverage measures after the estimations. The DFBETA measures the distance that a regression coefficient would shift when an observation is 
included or excluded from the regression, scaled by the estimated standard error of the coefficient (Baum, 2006).  
12
 We exclude banks that were merged and acquired during the period because there are not enough observations for these banks to include 
in our study. 
13
 Mean over the period of the study. 
14
 In 1999, there are a total of 46 universal and commercial banks, and in 2005, 41 universal and commercial banks.  
15
 Banks are classified as foreign if: 1) they are subsidiaries of foreign banks, or 2) branches of foreign banks. This classification is mainly 
drawn from the Monetary Board’s authorized mode of entry (Sec. 2, Republic Act NO. 7721) of foreign banks to operate in the Philippine 
banking system.  Sec. 2. Modes of Entry – The Monetary Board may authorize foreign banks to operate in the Philippine banking system 
through any of the following modes of entry: (i) by acquiring, purchasing or owning up to sixty percent (60%) of the voting stock of an 
existing bank; (ii) by investing in up to sixty percent (60%) of the voting stock of a new banking subsidiary incorporated under the laws of 
the Philippines; or (iii) by establishing branches with full banking authority: provided, that a foreign bank may avail itself of only one(1) 
domestic bank of new banking subsidiary. (Republic Act NO. 7721, An Act Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of Foreign 
Banks in the Philippines and for other purposes). 
16
 www.bsp.gov.ph 
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income from trading government securities, private equity/debt; financial futures, forwards 
and swaps; profit from the sale of investments; and profit from foreign exchange. 
For the listed banks of our sample, daily market data for stock prices are obtained from 
Datastream International. 
2.2 Definition of variables 
2.2.1 Diversification measures 
In this study, two sets of diversification indicators are computed and alternatively used 
to assess the effect of the increased diversification of Philippine banks on their profitability 
and risk.  
A first set of indicators used in this study consists of ratios which represent the share of 
non-interest income in total operating income, as well as the shares of each component of 
non-interest income in total operating income. The variable NII is equal to the percentage 
share of non-interest income in total operating income, where non-interest income17 is the sum 
of fee-based income, trading income and other non-interest income. We use the gross values 
because there is no categorical expense attributed to these activities alone in the income 
statement provided in our data. In addition, the reported non-interest expense is independent 
of the non-interest income. Our definition of total operating income is consistent with the 
studies of Stiroh (2004b), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Chiorazzo et al. (2008). 
 In equation, NII is computed as follows: 
NII = Non-interest Income/Total Operating Income                                                                (1) 
We also disaggregate NII into three components as defined by the Central Bank – 
FEE18, TRAD and Other. These variables are computed as follows: 
FEE = Fee-based income19/Total Operating Income                               (2) 
TRAD = Trading income20/Total Operating Income                     (3) 
Other = Other income/Total Operating Income                     (4) 
 
 A second set of indicators used in this paper, FOCUSk, consists of Herfindahl indices. 
As in Chiorazzo et al. (2008), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Sanya and Wolfe (2011), the 
                                                          
17 The definition of the non-interest income accounts are shown in the Appendix 1. 
18
 The  definition of the different components of non-interest income are drawn from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ glossary of terms, 
which can be found in the BSP website, www.bsp.gov.ph/banking/glossary.asp 
19
 Fee-based income = Bank commissions + service charges/fees + other fees/commissions 
20
 Trading income = Trading gains/(losses) (from government securities, private debt/equity securities, and financial futures, options) + 
Foreign exchange profits/(losses)+Gold trading gains/(losses) + Profit/(loss) on sale of redemption of investments. 
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indices measure how focused or specialized a bank is on its income generating activities. We 
compute them as follows: 
Let ji,tX  be the nominal exposure of bank i at time t to activity j where j = 1,....,n. ji,tx  
denotes the corresponding relative exposure, i.e. 
j
i,tj
i,t
j
i,t
1
X
x
X
n
j
             (5) 
  2j ji,t i,t
1
FOCUSk x
n
j                                                                       (6) 
 
where k = 1,…, 4.  
FOCUSk is an index equal to 1 when total income is generated from one source 
(specialized) and 1
n
 when exposures to each income component are equal (well-diversified). 
A lower value of the index indicates that a bank is more diversified. k denotes the level of 
disaggregation of operating income (FOCUS1), or of non-interest income (FOCUS2) and its 
components (FOCUS3 and FOCUS4) used to compute the indicator. Our first index, 
FOCUS1 is based on the disaggregation of the operating income – net interest income and 
non-interest income. The three other indices we use, FOCUS2, FOCUS3 and FOCUS421, are 
based on the disaggregation of non-interest income, fee-based income and trading income, 
respectively. 
2.2.2 Bank Profitability and Performance Measures 
To measure the profitability of a bank, we use the bank income statement return on 
average assets (ROA) and construct a risk-adjusted profitability measure, SHROA, following 
Chiorazzo et al. (2008). We define it as the ratio of ROA for a given year to the standard 
deviation of ROA over the period of study, 1999-2005. 
                                    
it
it
it it-1
NetIncomeAfterTaxROA = ((Asset Asset ) / 2)  (7) 
                                                          
21
 FOCUS2 =  (share of interest income to total operating income)^2+(share of fee-based income to total operating income)^2+(share of 
trading income to total operating income)^2+(share of other noninterest income to total operating income)^2 
    FOCUS3 = (share of interest income to total operating income)^2+(share of bank commissions to total operating income)^2+(share of 
service charges to total operating income)^2+(share of other commissions/fees to total operating income)^2+(share of trading income to total 
operating income)^2+(share of other noninterest income to total operating income)^2 
    FOCUS4 = (share of interest income to total operating income)^2+(share of fee-based income to total operating income)^2+(share of 
trading gain from government securities to total operating income)^2+(share of trading gain from private debt/equity to total operating 
income)^2+(share of trading gain from financial futures to total operating income)^2+(share of foreign exchange profit to total operating 
income)^2+(share of profit from sale of redemption of investments to total operating income)^2+(share of other non-interest income to total 
operating income)^2 
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it
it
i
ROASHROA = σROA  (8) 
2.2.3 Bank Risk Measures 
 For the 16 listed banks in our sample, we compute risk and insolvency measures using 
market data obtained from DataStream International. There are a total of 16 listed banks in 
our sample; however, sufficient data are only available for 15 banks. We compute risk-taking 
measures such as i) the market model beta (Beta)22 coefficient estimated through a GARCH 
model measuring systematic risk, ii) total risk (TotRisk), which is the standard deviation of 
weekly returns23 and iii) specific risk (RiskSpec)24, which is the standard deviation of the 
market model residual. We also compute a default risk measure using a market-data-based Z-
score (MZ)25. This measure represents the number of standard deviations below the mean by 
which profits would have to fall to deplete equity capital (Boyd et al. (1993)). 
 
2.3 Main trends in portfolio structure and income structure in the Philippine banking 
system  
Tables 1A and 1B highlight significant differences in income structure according to 
bank size (large, medium and small), bank type (universal and commercial banks) and 
ownership type (foreign and domestic).  
[Insert Tables 1A and 1B] 
Over the 1999-2005 sample period, the share of non-interest income in total operating 
income is, on average, equal to 35.92%. Most of the non-interest income is drawn from 
trading activities (45.30%) compared to fee-based activities (38%). Trading in government 
securities and foreign exchange profit are the largest source of trading income26 (30.60% and 
51.50%), while service charges dominate the fee-based income sources (61.40%). We can 
observe different profiles of diversification and non-interest income structure according to the 
size and ownership structure of the bank. Larger banks present a higher level of non-interest 
income in total operating income (38.16 % for large banks and 39% for medium-sized banks) 
                                                          
22
 We estimate the single index market model over the period [t-100, t] to calculate the value of the beta at date t. 
23
 Daily stock prices are used to calculate weekly stock returns. The standard deviation of weekly stock returns at date t is computed over the 
period [t-100, t]. 
24
 The single index market model is computed for each trading day over the period [t-100, t]. We use the standard deviation of residuals to 
estimate specific risk at date t. 
25
 
R+1
MZ = σ  where R is the mean of the weekly returns Rt for a given year and σ is the standard deviation of weekly returns. 
26
 The mean of the different categories of TRAD (GS, PD, FF, PI an d FP) do not necessarily add up to that of TRAD because of the second 
criterion used to select our sample: the gross income components must be non-negative, which ensures that the focus indices are bounded 
from 0 to 1.  
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than small banks (32.22%). However, the difference between large and medium-sized banks 
becomes more pronounced when we exclude state banks. Non-interest income is mainly 
generated from trading activities across banks of different sizes, with the exception of large 
banks when state banks are excluded. Foreign exchange profit and trading of government 
securities are the two main sources of trading income for all types of banks. However, 
whereas foreign exchange profit represents the main component for large and small banks 
(38.50% and 67.60%), the trading income of medium-sized banks comes essentially from the 
trading of government securities (43.10%).  
In terms of ownership, we observe that the degree of involvement in non-interest 
activities is similar between domestic banks and foreign banks. For foreign banks, fee-based 
activities represent the main source of non-interest income (47.70%), followed by trading 
activities (40.80%). For these banks, foreign exchange profit is the main source of revenue in 
trading activities (74.70%). On the contrary, domestic banks are more involved in trading 
activities (47.80%), of which government securities trading is the largest component 
(41.90%). Marked differences are also observed between universal and commercial banks. 
Universal banks have higher shares of non-interest income compared to commercial banks 
(39.38% and 34.62%). In addition, commercial banks have higher shares of fee-based income 
but universal banks present a higher involvement in trading and other non-interest activities.  
 Philippine banks exhibit higher levels of involvement in non-interest activities than 
those reported in Sanya and Wolfe (2011) for their set of emerging countries and similar 
levels of involvement in non-interest income activities in direct comparison with those 
reported in US and European studies. We observe differences, however, in terms of the 
structure of non-interest income. We stress the relatively high involvement in trading 
activities for Philippine banks. In 2000, Stiroh (2004b) reports that in the case of US banks, 
an average bank’s fees and other income makes up 27% of net operating income, while only 
3.5% come from trading income. In Europe, Lepetit et al. (2008) show that over the 1996-
2002 period, average commission income comprises 23.16% of net operating income, and 
9.7% from trading income. Indeed the differences in the income structure of banks across 
banking markets may contribute to how a shift towards non-interest income may impact bank 
profits and risk-adjusted profits. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework, Hypotheses and Models 
The structural changes in the banking industry and the proliferation of alternative 
financing sources for firms have enabled banks to consistently look out for other ways to 
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increase their profits besides lending.  From a theoretical point of view, banks benefit from 
economies of scope when they diversify their income (Klein and Saidenberg, 1997). Banks 
increase their efficiency and enhance profitability as they tend to eliminate redundant 
operations and capitalize on obtained client information when they process loans to facilitate 
provision of other financial services.  
Conventional wisdom asserts that revenue diversification, or a shift from interest to 
non-interest income, should reduce total risk. Activities that generate non-interest income are 
thought to be negatively, weakly or imperfectly correlated with those that produce interest 
income, thereby stabilizing profits and improving the risk-return trade-off. In addition, a shift 
toward non-interest income is believed to reduce cyclical variations of bank profits, 
depending less on overall business conditions (Stiroh, 2004b).  
 
While it may seem that diversification is largely desirable for a bank, arguments that 
refute the ability of income diversification to reduce risk are offered in several banking 
studies. Notably, DeYoung and Roland (2001) offers three ways by which non-interest 
income may increase bank earnings’ volatility. First, the presence of high switching costs for 
borrowers associated with lending relationships may suggest that banks tend to easily lose 
clients from a fee-based one. Second, a bank tends to additionally invest in technology and 
human resources as it moves towards activities that generate noninterest income; hence, 
increasing operating leverage and thus, earnings volatility. Third, some fee-based activities 
that may be carried out with little or no regulatory capital could be associated with a high 
degree of financial leverage, which increases earnings volatility. Financial innovation, such as 
the increased bank usage of derivative instruments and other financial transactions has also 
provided various opportunities to leverage a portfolio. New risks are compounded on top of 
existing risks, potentially offsetting or cancelling out the benefits from diversification. 
We thus test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A shift towards non-interest income enhances bank profitability and reduces 
risk, hence improving bank risk-adjusted profits. 
 Model 1:  
 
it it 1 it 2 it it itY = α + β FOCUS1 + β NII + įZ + İ                                                                                      (9) 
where Yit is either a measure of profitability, risk-adjusted profitability or risk ; FOCUS1it is 
the measure of diversification based on the breakdown of total operating income in two 
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components (interest and non-interest income) and NIIit is the share of non-interest income. 
Zit is a vector of control variables. 
β1 measures the impact of diversification and β2, the direct effect of a shift from interest 
activities to non-interest activities. If income diversity leads to higher profits and risk-adjusted 
profits, one would expect β1 to be negative. 
We follow here the methodology developed by Stiroh and Rumble (2006) in order to 
assess the effects of diversification towards non-interest activities. The impact of a change in 
non-interest income on profitability and risk is measured using the first derivative of our 
dependent variables with respect to non-interest income: 
it it
1 2
it it
Y FOCUS1β ' β '
NII NII
                                                                                                       (10) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (10) measures the effect of a change in 
the non-interest income share through its effect on diversification. As in Stiroh and Rumble 
(2006), we refer to this as the indirect effect of a change in non-interest income. As this effect 
depends both on the sign of β1’and the magnitude of the non-interest income share, the 
indirect effect is calculated accordingly for different levels of non-interest income. 
Meanwhile, β2’ captures the direct effect of a shift from interest income to non-interest 
income. Using a portfolio-style interpretation, β1’ measures the covariance effect, while β2’ 
measures the variance effect.  
The net effect, which is the sum of the direct and indirect effects, determines how 
profitability and risk vary with an increase in the share of non-interest income. 
The dependence, however, between β1’ and β2’ raises econometric issues since NII and 
FOCUS1 are collinear. Although both estimates may be unbiased, their variance and 
covariance are overestimated (Chiorazzo et al. 2008). Wald tests need to be conducted to 
check the joint statistical significance of β1’ and β2’ in the various estimations. Moreover, we 
also estimate the equation by using only NII to check for robustness. 
Several empirical research studies argue that the potential benefits/disadvantages from 
diversification may diverge because of ownership differences. Although the importance of 
size in the bank diversification-risk/profitability nexus has been largely documented in the 
literature, looking into ownership profiles of banks may be more relevant in our study because 
most foreign banks, which are branches and subsidiaries of foreign banking groups, are 
considered “small” when we take into account their total assets in the country. Categorizing 
banks according to size, thus, might underscore the gains from diversification of “large” 
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banks. According to the literature, such banks are in a better position to manage operating 
leverage associated with shifts towards activities generating non-interest income because of 
economies of scale and their capability to intensively invest in information technology 
(DeYoung and Roland, 2001).  
Bank strategies differ because of differences in customer preferences, information 
quality and production methods, which could be driven by differences in bank ownership 
profiles. There is a tendency for foreign-owned institutions or foreign banks to be more 
oriented towards transactions lending and provide financial services to large corporate clients 
rather than to lend to smaller firms, more likely catered by domestic banks. Empirical studies 
show that foreign banks tend to have wholesale orientation and may favorably lend to large 
corporate affiliates of their customers in their home nation (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Grosse 
and Goldberg, 1991). In addition, foreign banks are more exposed to developed country 
banking markets, which tend to be more competitive and use more sophisticated information 
and communication technologies (Claessens et al., 2001). These advantages could favor 
foreign banks in managing operating and financial leverage when diversifying towards non-
interest activities.  
 
To assess the possible divergence in the effect of a shift towards non-interest income by 
ownership, we test the following extension to Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1a: A shift towards non-interest income will differently impact profitability and 
risk of banks with different ownership. 
We use Model 1 to test Hypothesis 1a on a subsample of foreign banks and domestic 
banks. 
Knowing the sources of non-interest income is important in better understanding the 
mechanisms by which income diversification may affect a bank’s profitability and risk. 
According to DeYoung and Rice (2004), it is fundamentally misunderstood that commercial 
banks earn non-interest income mainly from non-traditional banking activities. They 
demonstrate that the largest source of non-interest income of banks in the U.S. comes from 
payment services – one of the most traditional of all the banking services. Banks have always 
traditionally earned non-interest income from deposit account services, lending, cash 
management and trust account service. Nontraditional banking activities include investment 
banking, securities brokerage, insurance and trading activities. The growth of traditional 
banking activities that generate non-interest income is expected to be positively correlated 
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with the growth of interest-generating activities like lending27 and nontraditional banking 
activities to be weakly or negatively correlated with interest-generating activities.  
 
We follow Stiroh’s (2004a) framework of the decomposition of portfolio growth 
volatility as shown in Equation 11. Net operating revenue is composed of non-interest income 
and net interest income. Non-interest income is a function of income from traditional 
(TRADTL) and nontraditional (NONTRADTL) banking activities. 
 
2 2 2 2 2
ln ln ln(1 ) 2 (1 ) ( ln , ln )d OPREV d NON d NON Cov d NON d NET                                    (11) 
Where ( ; )NON f TRADTL NONTRADTL
 
A shift towards non-interest income generated from traditional banking activities may 
not imply diversification benefits (or a reduction of diversification benefits) since they are 
subject to the same fluctuations as interest-generating activities and may lead to increased 
earnings volatility. This may be the case when banks cross-sell their other financial products 
to a core customer base. Diversification benefits, however, is higher when a bank shifts 
toward non-interest income generated from non-traditional banking activities. However, 
standard portfolio theory also implies that the overall variance of operating revenue rises as 
the volatilities of the growth rates of income from both traditional and non-traditional banking 
activities increase. 
We disaggregate non-interest income into fee-based, trading and other non-interest 
income. As shown in Tables 1A and 1B, in the case of banks in the Philippines, we may, 
however, associate fee-based income and other non-interest income as non-interest income 
generated from traditional banking activities. Fee-based income are primarily generated from 
bank commissions collected for services as in opening of letters of credit and sale of demand 
drafts, and service charges collected for handling loans. Other commissions and fees, which 
are collected for services in connection with the investment house functions of the bank, 
however, are low to cause significant variations in the bank’s revenue. We highlight this as 
one of the main differences between banks in emerging economies and developed economies 
such as the U.S. (DeYoung and Rice, 2004). Moreover, we associate trading income to be 
non-interest income generated from nontraditional banking activities. We confirm these 
assumptions by performing pairwise correlations of the growth rates of operating income, its 
components (interest income and non-interest income) and the non-interest income 
                                                          
27
 We do not discount the possibility that the growth of traditional banking activities may be due to the use of 
new, non-traditional methods, such as advances in information technology. 
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components (fee-based income, trading income).  The growth rate of fee-based income is 
positively and significantly correlated with the growth rate of net interest income (0.1568, 5% 
level of significance) while trading income is weakly and negatively correlated with net 
interest income growth (-0.0538). Similarly, we also find that the growth of interest income 
from loans is positively and significantly correlated with fee-based income (0.1120, 10% level 
of significance), suggesting that most banks may seize cross-selling opportunities, which may 
lessen benefits derived from diversification. 
 
We test the following hypothesis,  
Hypothesis 2: A shift towards non-interest income from nontraditional banking activities will 
generate greater diversification benefits than a shift towards non-interest income from 
traditional banking activities. 
This hypothesis will be tested by using a three-level breakdown of non-interest income 
– fee-based income, trading income and other non-interest income (Model 2a).  
 
Model 2a: 
it it 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it it itY = α + β FOCUS2  + β FEE + β TRAD + β Other + Z + İ                                         (12) 
where Yit is either a measure of profitability, risk-adjusted profitability or risk; FOCUS2it is 
the measure of diversification based on the breakdown of non-interest income in three 
components (fee-based, trading and other income); FEEit, TRADit and Otherit are the shares of 
fee-based income, trading income and other non-interest income, respectively, in total 
operating income. Zit is a vector of control variables. 
 
We use the following control variables – ASSETS, GROWTH, EQUITY, LOANS and 
GDP in all our models. 
ASSETS, is the natural logarithm of bank assets adjusted to the GDP deflator. This 
variable, following Chiorazzo et al. (2008), Behr et al. (2007), Stiroh and Rumble (2006), and 
Stiroh (2004a, 2004b) captures the effects of bank size on returns and risk. Larger-sized banks 
are able to invest in more advanced technologies and generally, have better risk management. 
They are also able to expand into other business lines. We therefore expect a positive sign for 
the relationship between size and profits and negative between size and risk. 
GROWTH, is the growth rate of total assets. As in Stiroh (2004b) and Chiorazzo et al. 
(2008), we use this variable as a proxy for bank manager’s preference for risk taking. Banks 
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with lower risk aversion grow more rapidly and thus, have different operating strategies. 
Moreover, it may also be interpreted as control for growth-by-acquisition. 
EQUITY, is the leverage ratio computed as the ratio of total capital to total assets. Banks 
that hold a lower level of equity in their asset-liability portfolio tend to be riskier. A higher 
level of capital then translates to the bank manager’s risk aversion. This control variable is 
also used by several bank diversification studies (Chiorazzo et al., 2008, Stiroh, 2004b). 
LOANS, is the ratio of total loans to total assets. Consistent with Chiorazzo et al. (2008), 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and DeYoung and Roland (2001), this variable captures the 
performance of bank’s lending strategies relative to its other earning assets. 
GDP is the logarithm of the real gross domestic product. This variable controls for 
macroeconomic fluctuations and overall performance of the economy. We expect a positive 
sign as banks tend to expect higher profits when the economy is doing well.  
We run two-way fixed-effects panel regressions to estimate our models. In performing 
these estimations, we check for the appropriateness of our estimation method using the 
Hausman test to check whether a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a random 
effects model.  In addition, we use a Huber/White estimator of variance that is robust to some 
types of misspecifications along with the fixed effects model. 
Since the alternative dependent variables we use, particularly profitability, show the 
tendency to persist in time 28 , reflecting impediments to competition, informational 
asymmetry, and change in business strategies, we consider that their previous values could 
partially determine their current values (Berger et al., 2000). We therefore also estimate our 
equations using a dynamic model using the methodology proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In this approach, the system of equations is 
simultaneously estimated in both first-differences and levels. The two step GMM estimator is 
used to provide a more robust inference from the results. However, we also use the one-step 
estimator 29 . Since we are considering a small sample, the two step standard errors are 
computed to conform to Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction. We also take into 
account the possibility that the explanatory variables might not be strictly exogenous, which is 
presumably the case of the non-interest income variables. Following Maudos and Solis 
(2009), to address this endogeneity problem, the lagged levels and lagged differences of the 
explanatory variables are used as instruments. To determine the consistency of the estimators 
                                                          
28
 In the banking literature, few studies consider profits to be persistent ( Roland, 1997; Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001; Goddard et al., 
2004) 
29
 Results using one-step estimators are not reported but are available from the authors on request. 
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and verify the validity of the instruments, we use a Sargan test of over identifying restrictions. 
Meanwhile, we also check for the appropriateness of using the Blundell dynamic panel data 
estimation technique using the statistic proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test the 
absence of second-order serial correlation of the first difference residuals.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 2A reports the results obtained for Model 1. The regressions with profitability and 
risk-adjusted profitability show positive benefits derived from an increase in income diversity 
and a shift from interest to non-interest income, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. The 
coefficient of the share of non-interest income is positive and highly significant, which is 
consistent with the results obtained by Chiorazzo et al. (2008), studying Italian banks. This 
finding, however, is in contrast with several US banking studies like Stiroh (2004a; 2004b) 
and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and a study of emerging economies by Sanya and Wolfe 
(2011), which associates risk-reduction benefits from increased share of NII but no significant 
effect in terms of risk-adjusted profits. 
[Insert Table 2A] 
As discussed in the previous section, a shift towards non-interest income has two 
effects: a direct effect from an increased reliance on non-interest income and an indirect effect 
through changes in diversification. Table 2B reports the indirect and net effects of a change in 
the share of non-interest income at various percentile levels of non-interest income share. 
Regardless of the level of non-interest income, our results suggest that an increased share of 
non-interest income offers no significant indirect effects through diversification on both 
profitability and risk-adjusted profitability. To measure the economic significance of these 
estimates, we consider the net effect of a change in non-interest income share as shown in 
Table 2B. Evaluating at the 50th percentile value of NII, the results predict that a one standard 
deviation increase in non-interest income share will lead to an increase in the ROA and 
SHROA of 0.02 and 2.27, respectively. Moreover, we highlight the decreasing net effects of 
NII as the level of non-interest income share increases. This result confirms the diminishing 
marginal benefits when banks diversify beyond risk efficient levels (Stiroh and Rumble 
2006).  
[Insert Table 2B] 
 Chiorazzo et al. (2008) argue that the inconsistency with the results of the U.S. and 
European banking studies is due to structural and regulatory differences between the 
European and U.S. markets, which include bank size, longevity of fee-based relationships and 
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diffusion of credit scoring methods. In our interpretation, the contrast in the results of most 
U.S. banking studies and our study comes from two main differences between the income 
structure of the Philippine banking system and that of the US: first, the correlation between 
the growth rates of interest income and non-interest income and second, the distribution of the 
components of non-interest income. Stiroh (2004b) shows the relatively high correlation 
between interest income and non-interest income in US banks from 1984 to 2001, implying 
less diversification benefits as the banking industry shifts towards non-interest revenue. In the 
Philippines, however, the correlation between the growth rates of interest income and non-
interest income is weak. The diversification benefits from increased economies of scope 
coupled with the weak correlation between non-interest income growth and interest income 
growth fuels the positive impact of a shift towards non-interest income on risk-adjusted 
profitability. We also observe significant differences in the distribution of non-interest income 
between banks in the Philippines and the U.S. Stiroh (2004b) highlights that in the U.S. in 
2000, an average bank’s fees and other income comprise 27% of net operating income while 
trading income’s share in the net operating income is only 3.5%. We show that in the case of 
the Philippines (Table 1A), in 1999, trading income (16.5% of net operating income) 
dominates fee-based income (13.2%). Consistent with our sample, U.S. banks exhibit high 
correlation between the growth rates of net interest income and fee-based income, while a 
weak correlation exists between trading income growth and net interest income growth. This 
is reasonable as trading income is more dependent on market fluctuations than traditional 
banking activities, implying greater diversification benefits should a bank decide to shift its 
interest income towards this particular component (Stiroh, 2004a).  
 
The impact of an increase in income diversification, more precisely, a shift towards 
non-interest activities on profitability and risk-adjusted profitability diverges according to 
bank ownership profile. Table 3A shows the results on a subsample of foreign versus 
domestic banks. Our findings indicate that increased income diversity does not affect profits 
and risk-adjusted profits both within domestic and foreign banks. The direct effect of an 
increase in the share of non-interest income, however, translates to higher profits for foreign 
banks and a positive and significant impact on risk-adjusted profits in both subsamples. To 
gauge the economic significance of the estimated impact of a shift towards non-interest 
income, we report the net effects as presented in Table 3B. These estimates predict that a one 
standard deviation increase in non-interest income share will lead to an increase in the risk-
adjusted profits of 1.63 and 4.45, respectively, for domestic banks and foreign banks at higher 
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shares of NII (75th percentile). Hence, only the domestic and foreign banks, which are already 
heavily involved in non-interest activities can actually benefit from a further shift from 
traditional interest-generating activities to activities that generate non-interest income. 
Moreover, we highlight that the effect on risk-adjusted profits goes down in the case of 
domestic banks, as non-interest income increases. In contrast, as foreign banks tend to focus 
on non-interest activities, a further shift generates bigger risk-adjusted profits. This may 
suggest that it pays for foreign banks to specialize in non-interest activities, consistent with 
the studies of Stein (2002), Berger and Udell (2006), which highlight the disadvantage of 
foreign-owned institutions in collecting soft information that is crucial in lending to small 
local firms and lack of knowledge of the local domestic market.  
 
[Insert Tables 3A & 3B] 
We report results of the impact of a shift towards the different components of non-
interest income on profits and risk-adjusted profits in Table 4. Consistent with our second 
hypothesis, our findings suggest the presence of greater benefits from diversification if a bank 
shifts from traditional interest generating activities toward nontraditional banking activities 
that generate non-interest income. Indeed, we observe positive and significant direct effects of 
an increase in the share of trading income to operating income on risk-adjusted profits. 
Moreover, we find a negative effect of a shift towards fee-based income on risk-adjusted 
profits, which is consistent with several U.S. banking studies like Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
and Stiroh (2004b). These results may be driven by the positive correlation between the 
growth rates of net interest income and fee-based income, implying that cross-selling is highly 
likely in Philippine banks and the presence of a blurring demarcation line between income 
from lending and fee-based income. Furthermore, it is reasonable that a shift towards trading 
income translates to greater benefits from increased diversification as its growth shows weak 
correlation with traditional banking activities, responding more to different shocks such as 
market fluctuations.  
[Insert Table 4] 
For our control variables, overall, we find that bank size, ASSET, measured by the 
natural logarithm of bank assets has a positive impact on ROA and SHROA, but of which the 
impact decreases as the level of non-interest income increases. When we examine the 
subsample of domestic banks and foreign banks, however, we observe a positive relationship 
between profits and an increase in bank size but only for foreign banks.  This may suggest 
that foreign banks are better able to exploit scale economies and have more efficient risk 
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management techniques. The coefficients associated with LOANS are positive and significant 
in terms of ROA, but only for our fixed effects panel regressions. We do not find, however, 
any significant relation between an increase in lending activity and risk-adjusted profits. Our 
results are in line with DeYoung and Rice (2004) but slightly differ from those of Chiorazzo 
et al. (2008) who find a positive impact of increased loans on risk-adjusted returns. The ratio 
of equity to total assets has an ambiguous effect on profits and risk-adjusted profits. We 
observe a negative relationship between ROA and EQUITY, suggesting that an increase in 
bank capitalization translates to lower profits. Our fixed effects regression results, however, 
suggests that an increase in bank capitalization increases risk-adjusted profits. GROWTH, 
meanwhile has contradicting effects on ROA, notably in domestic and foreign banks. We find 
that as banks grow rapidly, profits also soar in the case of domestic banks, while profits 
decline in the case of foreign banks. We do not find, however, any significant impact of a 
change in asset growth on risk-adjusted profits. We also control for the level of growth of the 
economy, GDP, and overall, our results show that expected bank profits and risk-adjusted 
profits benefit from stronger economic growth. 
 
5. Further Investigation 
5.1 SME Lending and Income Diversification 
The history of Philippine banking reveals a developmental role assigned to the banking 
system. Several mandated credit programs are imposed with the aim of allocating credit to 
sectors that are critical from a social standpoint. Lending targets set for priority sectors are 
imposed in several emerging economies like India, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka (CGAP Financial Access 2010). From a theoretical point of view, mandated credit 
programs are inefficient ways to allocate scarce financial resources, potentially distorting 
bank strategies (Medalla and Ravalo, 1997).  
One of the mandated credit programs in the Philippines is the Magna Carta for Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). As stipulated in the RA 697730, all lending institutions, such 
as banks are mandated to set aside at least six percent (6%) and at least two percent (2%) of 
their total loan portfolio to small and medium enterprises, respectively. There are, however, 
alternative ways to comply with this specific regulation. Banks may subscribe to the preferred 
                                                          
30
 Republic Act No. 6977 (later amended by Republic Act No. 8929)– An act to promote, develop and assist small and medium scale 
enterprises through the creation if a Small and Medium Enterprise Development (SMED) Coucil, and the rationalization of government 
assistance, programs and agencies concerned with the development of Small and Medium Enterprises, and for other purposes. It was later 
amended by Republic Act No. 9501 in 2008 to increase the percentage set aside for small enterprises from six percent (6%) to eight percent 
(8%). 
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shares of the Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC) or subscribe or 
purchase liability instruments as may be offered by SBGFC31.   
As highlighted in the literature (Berger and Udell, 2001), small business lending tends 
to rely more on relationship lending where banks have to gather soft information. Although 
recent literature suggests several lending technologies such as credit scoring and factoring 
may be used by banks to cater to informationally opaque small firms, large banks in emerging 
economies may still find it difficult to use these technologies because they require efficient 
and good information infrastructure. The alternative ways of complying may thus be more 
desirable from the point of view of larger and foreign banks as they are also less likely to be 
involved in relationship lending. Moreover, foreign banks, which do not have the specific 
knowledge of local domestic markets, could be disadvantaged in collecting soft information, 
which is vital in relationship lending.  
We report in Table 5 the aggregate data on the compliance to the Magna Carta for Small 
and Medium Enterprises of the universal and commercial banks (UKBs) over the period of 
study. Although the UKBs collectively allocate more funds than the minimum amount to be 
allocated for SMEs (in 2005, 19.77% versus the required 8%), an average of 2.07% 
alternative/indirect compliance (to total net loan portfolio) indicates the presence of banks that 
do not comply by lending to the set minimum. The distribution of the total credit to SMEs, 
however, is disproportionate. Of the 19.77% compliance to the mandated credit to SMEs, 
9.24% (versus 6% required) are allocated to small enterprises, while 10.53% (versus 2% 
required) are allotted to medium enterprises.  It is also worthy to note that funds set aside to 
SMEs32, which is also another way to comply to the Magna Carta for Small and Medium 
Enterprises has been consistently increasing over the period of study.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Because of the organizational diseconomies of providing relationship lending services 
along with providing transactions lending and other wholesale capital market services to large 
corporate customers, it may be too costly to provide financial services to small firms while 
maintaining provision of different banking services to large clients (Berger et al., 2001). A 
shift towards non-interest income may therefore more likely benefit banks that are less 
inclined to directly comply with the Magna Carta for SMEs by lending, indicating their 
expertise on the provision of other financial services besides lending. 
                                                          
31
 This organization is now known as the Small Business Corporation 
32
 Consists of either Cash on Hand and Due from BSP which are free, unencumbered, not hypothecated, not utilized or earmarked for other 
purposes. The Due from BSP is a special account deposited with the BSP and does not form part of the bank's legal reserves. Under the new 
mandatory credit allocation (RA 9501) beginning 2008, Funds Set Aside is no longer considered as a mode of compliance. 
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Since we do not have detailed information which provides disaggregated data of the 
compliance ratios33 of individual banks isolating direct lending from alternative compliance, 
we group banks according to their compliance ratios that may reveal their behavior towards 
SME lending. We group banks according to their level of compliance: 1) banks that comply to 
the mandated credit program by holding more SME loans than required in their loan portfolio 
and 2) banks that are lending to SMEs because they are required by law, and thus have 
compliance ratios to the Magna Carta for SMEs that are close to the minimum. These banks 
are also more likely to alternatively comply by purchasing liability instruments or set aside 
funds for small enterprises 34 . Data on compliance ratios for individual banks are only 
available from 2005. We primarily look into bank compliance ratios to the Magna Carta for 
SMEs in 2005. Moreover, we check that the categorizations are robust by looking at average 
bank compliance ratios from 2005 to 2007. We identify 25 banks which are less likely to 
comply through direct lending and 12 banks, with compliance ratios greater than or equal to 
1.2%*MinimumLegalLimit (where MinimumLegalLimit=6%) 35 . We test Hypothesis 1 on 
these two subsamples. 
The results of the estimations are shown in Table 6A while the estimated impact of a 
shift towards non-interest income is reported in Table 6B. In terms of profitability, the 
findings indicate that a shift towards non-interest income increases profitability (through the 
direct effect and net effect) but only for banks that alternatively comply to the mandated SME 
lending program by acquiring designated securities or those that have low lending exposure to 
smaller firms. Conversely, banks that lend to SMEs more than what is required by law do not 
derive greater profits from shifting traditional interest-generating activities to non-interest 
generating ones. These results suggest that universal and commercial banks that lend more to 
SMEs benefit less from diversification.  More importantly, they highlight the presence of 
additional opportunity costs from lending to SMEs, in the form of lost profits, especially for 
the larger banks and most foreign banks that do not have expertise in lending to small 
businesses. Even with the presence of mandated credit programs, these banks may not have 
incentives to reallocate their funds towards priority sectors, such as the SMEs.  
[Insert Tables 6A & 6B] 
5.2 Listed Banks 
                                                          
33
 Our data of  the compliance ratios of the Magna Carta for SMEs of individual banks do not distinguish direct compliance through lending 
and alternative compliance through several means. 
34
 We focus our study on the micro and small enterprises, where bank financing may be more constrained compared with medium 
enterprises. In addition, most of the MSMEs in the Philippines belong to the micro and small enterprises group (90%). It is also more 
probable that banks alternatively comply in the micro and small enterprises group than in the medium enterprises group.  
35
 We also use several other coefficients such as 1.1 and 1.3 and obtain similar results.   
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We also study the effects of income diversification on the risk, profitability and risk-
adjusted profitability of listed and universal listed banks in the Philippines. Unlike 
commercial banks, universal banks are allowed to perform the activities of investment houses 
(RA 879136, PD 12937) and generally, are bigger in terms of size. Hence, the impact of income 
diversification may diverge between the two types of banks. Because of a scope and size 
advantage, we argue that universal banks are in a better position to diversify away from 
traditional interest-generating activities towards activities that generate non-interest income, 
particularly the non-traditional ones. We thus study the listed and universal listed banks38 and 
test hypotheses 1 and 2. The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8.  While we find in both 
subsamples a positive and significant direct effect of a shift towards non-interest income on 
profitability and risk-adjusted profitability, the value of the coefficient is higher in the case of 
universal listed banks. Moreover, in terms of risk, our results suggest that universal listed 
banks derive greater risk-reduction benefits from an increase in the share of non-interest 
income derives using market-based indicators. This result is driven primarily by a shift 
towards trading income, effectively increasing profits, reducing risk and hence, increasing 
risk-adjusted profits.                                                            
[Insert Tables 7 & 8] 
5.2 Components of Trading and Fee-based Income39 
We also examine the effects of a shift towards more specific/detailed fee-based and 
trading activities. We extend Hypothesis 2, investigating further the impact of a shift towards 
a traditional or a non-traditional banking activity, which earns non-interest income on profits 
and risk-adjusted profits. While this may have been studied using U.S. data as in Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006), this is the first study on an emerging economy that provides more details on 
the fee-based and trading income components of banks.  
We construct two new measures that take into account the separate components of fee-
based and trading income. We run a new set of regressions on the basis of the following 
models:  
it it 1 it 21 it 22 it 23 it 3 it 4 it it itY  = α + β FOCUS3  + β BC + β SC + β OC + β TRAD + β Other + Z + İ                         (13)  
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 Republic Act No. 8791. An Act Providing For the Regulation of the Organization and Operations of Banks, Quasi-Banks, Trust Entities 
and for Other Purposes. Artcile 1, Section 23. Powers of a Universal Bank. – A universal bank shall have the authority to exercise, in 
addition to the powers authorized for a commercial bank, the powers of an investment hourse as provided in existing laws and the power to 
invest in non-allied enterprises. 
37
 Presidential Decree No. 129. The Investment Houses Law. Section 2. Definitions: A) Investment House is any enterprise which primarily 
engages, whether regularly or on an isolated basis, in the underwriting of securities of another person or enterprise, including securities of the 
Government or its instrumentalities. 
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 Since there are not enough observations to investigate commercial listed banks, we compare all listed and universal banks.   
39
 Table of results not reported but available upon request from the authors 
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it it 1 2 it 31 it 32 it 33 it 34 it 35 it 4 it it itY α β FOCUS4 β FEE β GS β PD β FF β PI β FP β Other Z İit                   (14) 
FOCUS3it and FOCUS4it are measures of diversification within respectively detailed 
fee-based and trading incomes; BCit, SCit and OCit are the three components of fee-based 
activities and represent the shares of, respectively, bank commissions, service charges and 
other commissions in total operating income. GSit, PDit, FFit, PIit and FPit are the five 
components of trading activities and represent the shares of, respectively, government 
securities trading gains (losses), private debt trading gains (losses), financial futures gains 
(losses), and profit from investment and foreign exchange profits in total operating income. 
In contrast with Chiorazzo et al. (2008), we find that gains from diversification are 
associated with the source of non-interest income. Our findings are not in line with studies on 
U.S. banks (i.e. Stiroh, 2004b) which report higher risk for banks more reliant on trading 
activities. However, for European banks, Lepetit et al. (2008) do not find evidence of a 
positive relationship between trading activities and risk. 
The econometric investigation conducted on the detailed breakdown of fee-based and 
trading activities provides a clearer insight of how different product mixes within non-interest 
activities affect profitability and risk. Two main results are highlighted. First, in the case of 
fee-based activities, we find that an increased share of “other commissions and fees” to total 
operating income is associated with increased profitability but not risk-adjusted profitability. 
The second result relates to trading income. We find that a shift towards trading government 
securities and financial futures/options/forward/swaps, both non-traditional banking activities, 
lead to enhanced profitability and risk-adjusted profitability.  
Further differences in the diversification effect of Philippine banks into non-interest 
activities are analyzed by examining the specific case of universal banks, which unlike 
commercial banks, are allowed to perform the activities of investment houses (RA 879140, PD 
12941). Following existing studies (Bhargava and Fraser (1998), Akhigbe and Whyte (2004), 
Cornett et al. (2002)) which examine the effects of various regulations that pertain to bank 
expansion into investment banking activities, our aim here is to assess the risk implications of 
diversifying into such specific non-interest activities. We investigate the effects of the 
disaggregated shares of fee-based and trading income on the risk of universal banks and focus 
more particularly on the effect of increased shares in "other commissions/fees" (a component 
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 Republic Act No. 8791. An Act Providing For the Regulation of the Organization and Operations of Banks, Quasi-Banks, Trust Entities 
and for Other Purposes. Artcile 1, Section 23. Powers of a Universal Bank. – A universal bank shall have the authority to exercise, in 
addition to the powers authorized for a commercial bank, the powers of an investment hourse as provided in existing laws and the power to 
invest in non-allied enterprises. 
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 Presidential Decree No. 129. The Investment Houses Law. Section 2. Definitions: A) Investment House is any enterprise which primarily 
engages, whether regularly or on an isolated basis, in the underwriting of securities of another person or enterprise, including securities of the 
Government or its instrumentalities. 
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of fee-based income), which are commission and fees collected for investment house 
activities such as underwriting, securities dealership and equity investments, the 
nontraditional income component of fee-based activities. Our results show that in the case of 
universal banks, a shift towards investment house activities, although leading to higher 
profits, has an adverse effect on risk. This is consistent with some studies on developed 
countries that find shifts towards fee-based activities to be risky. Fee-based income earned 
from the investment house functions are, however, small compared to other fee-based 
components. Looking further on the disaggregation of trading income, we find that higher 
involvement in trading government securities leads to risk reduction, enhancing both 
profitability and risk-adjusted profitability. 
 
5. Robustness Checks42 
We also perform several robustness checks. First, we define alternative measures of 
diversification, particularly FOCUS1. As the index predicts the same degree of focus for 
banks that are more reliant on interest income, and for those that are more oriented towards 
non-interest income, it does not allow us to differentiate on which activities the bank is 
focused on. We then define another indicator, FOCUSDIV, which is the interaction term of 
FOCUS1 with a dummy variable, DIV, which is equal to 1 if the share of non-interest income 
is higher than 50% and zero, otherwise. The coefficient of FOCUSDIV indicates whether it 
pays to be more focused on non-interest activities compared to interest-generating ones. We 
also examine different thresholds of DIV- 30%, 40% and 60% and find that at a threshold of 
non-interest income less than 40%, focus on non-interest income does not translate into 
increased bank profitability. Moreover, with thresholds greater than 40%, we find that focus 
increases bank profitability. Our results are very robust to the 60% and 70% thresholds, which 
confirm that focusing in activities that generate non-interest income increases the profitability 
of Philippine banks.   
Second, we use a more limited definition of trading income, which includes only the 
gains/losses from trading activities (government securities, private/equity securities, and 
financial futures options/forwards/swaps). When this definition is used, we find "other non-
interest income" to be positively related to profitability and risk. This can be explained by the 
inclusion of other non-traditional, non-interest income generating activities like foreign 
exchange profit, gold trading gain/loss and the profit on sale or redemption of investments in 
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 For the sake of brevity, we do not report all the results discussed under the section of robustness check. However, the results are available 
from the authors on request. 
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our definition of "other non-interest income", driving up diversification benefits, notably risk-
adjusted profitability. The results however regarding trading income remain unchanged.  
 We also examine if there are significant behavioral differences between listed and 
non-listed banks. We do not find, however, significant differences over these two subsamples. 
 
6.   Summary and concluding remarks 
 Research on bank revenue diversification in developed countries, namely the U.S., has 
documented that a higher reliance on non-interest activities lowers risk-adjusted profits 
(Stiroh, 2004a, 2004b, 2006 and Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). In this paper, we find 
diversification to be beneficial for Philippine banks, consistent with Sanya and Wolfe (2011) 
who study the income diversification-performance relationship of listed banks in 11 emerging 
economies. Philippine banks have a different non-interest income structure. For an average 
Philippine bank, the share of trading activities in non-interest income is relatively higher 
compared with an average U.S. bank. Whereas most of the fee-based income is obtained from 
traditional bank intermediation activities, trading income is nontraditional as its growth is less 
correlated with net interest income growth. From a standard portfolio approach, this may 
indicate that there may be higher diversification benefits from shifts towards trading income 
activities rather than shifts towards fee-based income activities. Our empirical results support 
this hypothesis, suggesting that that shifts toward trading income, particularly from trading 
government securities, lead to higher bank profits and risk-adjusted profits.  
We also examine how bank ownership may affect the income diversification-
performance relationship. Our findings indicate that foreign banks have the upper hand in 
diversifying income compared with domestic banks. As foreign banks tend to specialize in 
non-interest income activities, a marginal increase in non-interest income tends to increase 
further their risk-adjusted profits. In emerging countries, foreign banks generally suffer from 
insufficient knowledge of the local market and disadvantage in terms of collecting soft 
information, which may be vital in lending not only to small businesses but also to larger 
firms. Thus it pays for them to specialize in non-interest income generating activities rather 
than traditional intermediation activities.  
We take our investigation deeper by tackling a specific regulatory aspect that is akin to 
emerging economies - the presence of mandated credit programs to SMEs. Particularly, we 
investigate the extent by which increased income diversification affects profitability and risk 
differently across banks with high and low exposures to SME financing. We find revenue 
diversification, more precisely, a shift towards non-interest income to benefit banks that lend 
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less to SMEs. This result suggests that for these banks, the presence of an additional 
opportunity cost in the form of lost profits further dissuades them to directly lend to SMEs. 
The existence of alternative ways to comply with the regulation, i.e. by acquiring specific 
government securities, may have hastened bank inefficiency generally attributed to mandated 
credit programs but at the expense of the social purpose of such development programs that 
aim to increase sustainable access to external finance to SMEs. Nevertheless, banks that 
allocate a higher percentage of their loan portfolio to SMEs are assumed to have appropriate 
lending technologies that address opaque small business borrowers and relatively less 
expertise in diversifying into non-interest activities, which may arise because of high 
switching costs. On the whole, our findings highlight that the development of nontraditional 
intermediation activities in banking have different implications in terms of profitability and 
risk in the case of an emerging economy. Specifically, bank ownership (foreign/domestic) and 
the engagement in SME funding as well as the presence of specific regulations to promote 
small scale lending matter.   
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APPENDIX: Definitions 
 
NON-INTEREST INCOME ACCOUNTS 
Fee-based Income: sum of bank commissions, service charges/fees and other commissions/fees 
Bank Commissions: commissions collected for services rendered as in: (a) opening of letters of 
credit, (b) handling of collection items, domestic/export/import bills and telegraphic transfers, and (c) 
sale of demand drafts, traveller’s checks and government securities 
Service charges: charges/fees, including commitment fees, collected for services rendered as in: (a) 
handling of loans and transactions and returned checks, (b) sale of manager’s checks. 
Fees/commissions (others): fees and commissions earned and collected for services rendered in 
connected with the investment house functions of the bank such as underwriting, securities dealership 
and equity investments. 
Trading income: sum of trading gain from government securities, private securities/commercial 
papers/equity securities, financial futures/options/forwards/swaps; foreign exchange profit/loss, gold 
trading gain/loss; profit on sale or redemption of investments. 
Trading gain (government securities): gain or loss on government securities traded in money market 
operations. 
Trading gain (private securities/commercial papers/equity securities): gain or loss in private 
securities/commercial papers/equity securities traded by the bank. 
Trading gain (financial futures/options/forwards/swaps): trading profits and loss (both realized and 
“mark-to-market”) arising from financial futures/options/forward/swap trading transactions. 
Foreign exchange profit: realized profit or actual loss incurred on foreign exchange transactions, 
including profit or loss arising from the adjustment of the peso equivalent of foreign monetary 
accounts consisting of foreign currencies on hand, due from foreign banks and short-term 
receivables/payables. 
Profit on sale or redemption of investments: profits earned or loss incurred on the sale or 
redemption of investments. 
Other non-interest income: sum of income from trust department and other income 
Income (trust department): commissions and other income earned and collected or loss suffered by 
the bank’s trust department in the handling/administration of trust accounts. 
Other income: rental income and miscellaneous income 
(Source: Manual of Accounts for Universal and Commercial Banks, Central Bank of the Philippines) 
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TABLES 
Table 1A: Descriptive statistics for Philippine universal and commercial banks over the 1999-2005 period  
  Whole sample Large Banks Large Banks excluding government banks Medium-sized Banks Small Banks 
  1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 1999-2005 
Assets 71.7 102 87.9 208 272 253 211 277 266 53.4 101 69.6 12.1 18.3 13.9 
Loans 50.4 48.98 49.02 52.53 46.62 49.59 52.44 46.22 49.81 55.22 39.7 46.22 45.54 56.79 50.96 
Equity 13.1 11.11 12.94 11.68 9.34 11.09 12.3 9.31 11.49 12.72 10.24 11.81 14.15 12.61 14.86 
Deposits 57.88 56.9 58.88 68.98 64.79 64.7 68.47 70.19 70.03 69.04 67.72 70.5 43.32 45.23 46.39 
NII 34.16 32.49 35.92 35.65 31.45 38.16 35.54 35.35 43.53 34.64 36.15 39 32.99 30.41 32.22 
FEE 13.16 13.56 13.37 12.75 13.9 14.14 14.39 17.85 17.48 14.94 11.87 13.6 12.01 14.59 12.78 
BC 4.07 3.7 4.01 3.69 3 3.93 4.19 4.08 5.06 4.29 2.37 2.68 4.12 5.01 5.14 
SC 7.68 7.93 8.07 7.81 9.74 8.96 8.77 12.26 10.88 9.9 9.41 10.64 5.91 5.97 5.53 
OC 1.4 1.93 1.29 1.25 1.17 1.25 1.44 1.51 1.53 0.76 0.08 0.28 1.98 3.63 2.12 
TRAD 16.48 14.29 16.82 15.77 11.51 15.45 13.18 10.95 16.24 14.65 18.09 19.47 18.27 12.97 15.41 
GS 5.45 6.79 6.8 3.21 3.91 6.93 3.47 5.89 8.76 4.87 13.1 9.78 6.89 4.31 4.58 
PD 2.43 0.6 2.14 2.87 1.85 1.82 0.94 1.55 1.67 4.7 0.06 2.16 0.66 0.39 2.27 
FF 0.04 0.26 0.39 0 0.52 0.6 0 0.08 0.57 0.03 0.47 0.59 0.07 0.03 0.16 
PI 0.86 1.44 1.43 2.84 3.27 2.64 0.35 2.27 1.04 0.79 2.01 2.43 0 0.11 0.2 
FP 8.38 5.78 6.65 6.67 5.04 6.39 7.52 4.7 7.16 6.2 3.27 5.02 10.64 7.6 8.03 
Other 4.52 4.64 5.85 7.13 6.03 8.81 7.96 6.55 10.16 5.04 6.19 6.05 2.71 2.84 4.09 
ROA 0.62 1.54 0.94 0.33 1.04 0.76 0.33 0.97 0.68 0.75 1.02 0.92 0.67 2.14 1.04 
Variable definitions (All variables are expressed in percentage except for total assets, which is expressed in billion pesos) Loans: ratio of  net loans to total assets; Equity: ratio 
of equity to total assets; Deposits: ratio of total deposits to total assets; NII: ratio of non-interest income to total net operating income; FEE: ratio of fee-based income to total net 
operating income; BC: ratio of bank commissions and fees to total net operating income; SC: ratio of service charges to total net operating income; OC: ratio of other 
commissions and fees to total net operating income; TRAD: ratio of trading income to total net operating income; GS: ratio of income from trading government securities to 
total net operating income; PD: ratio of income from trading private debt/equity to total net operating income; FF: ratio of income from trading financial futures and other 
derivatives to total net operating income; PI: ratio of profit from sale of investments to total net operating income; FP: ratio of foreign exchange profit to total net operating 
income; Other: ratio of other non-interest income to total net operating income; ROA: return on average asset; ROE: return on average equity. 
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Table 1A (continued). Descriptive statistics for Philippine universal and commercial banks over the 1999-2005 period 
  Domestic Banks Domestic Banks  (excluding government banks) Foreign Banks Universal Banks Commercial Banks 
  1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 1999-2005 1999 2005 All 1999 2005 1999-2005 
Assets 104 141 119 98 127 110 29.8 41.1 32.8 127 190 169 10.7 37.2 26.9 
Loans 53.81 43.69 47.95 53.87 43.22 47.86 45.93 57.36 50.93 55.61 44.42 48.67 48.63 41.52 46.73 
Equity 17.16 12.42 15.63 17.74 12.77 16.17 7.78 9.03 8.13 14.33 11.28 13.41 27.95 14.91 20.07 
Deposits 68.6 66.24 65.46 68.38 68 67.11 43.87 42.12 47.08 69.96 71.25 71.39 63.63 63.36 61.07 
NII 33.08 33.05 36.02 32.87 34.38 37.41 35.57 31.62 35.73 31.95 36.86 39.38 35.65 30.84 34.62 
Fee-based 11.41 11.59 11.59 11.94 12.48 12.34 15.46 16.67 16.57 10.8 12.89 12.66 15.37 11.9 11.89 
BC 2.4 2.2 2.52 2.51 2.43 2.73 6.26 6.1 6.69 2.95 3.09 3.4 1.19 1.48 1.77 
SC 7.86 7.8 8.17 8.22 8.31 8.67 7.45 8.14 7.89 6.86 9.05 8.49 12.31 7.26 8.93 
OC 1.15 1.59 0.89 1.21 1.74 0.94 1.73 2.46 1.99 0.99 0.75 0.77 1.87 3.16 1.19 
Trading 16.05 15.72 17.83 15.1 16.06 18.29 17.03 12.02 15.01 15.15 17.01 18.74 14.95 14.7 17.66 
GS 5.55 9.76 8.97 5.81 11.12 9.59 5.35 1.83 3.08 4.9 9.69 8.43 8.08 12.79 11.13 
PD 4.29 0.65 2.33 3.71 0.39 2.33 0.28 0.51 1.83 4.7 0.73 2.9 1.22 0 1.56 
FF 0 0.4 0.34 0 0.28 0.31 0.1 0.04 0.49 0 0.32 0.31 0 0.23 0.31 
PI 1.56 2.19 2.15 0.64 1.77 1.65 0 0.24 0.38 0.87 2.28 2.45 0 1.04 0.55 
FP 5.84 3.93 5.29 6.14 3.75 5.43 11.31 8.29 8.8 6.34 4.11 6.07 5.65 3.11 4.46 
Other 5.62 5.73 6.85 5.83 5.84 7.06 3.09 2.93 4.07 6 6.96 8.28 5.33 4.25 5.32 
ROA 0.77 1.19 0.94 0.8 1.18 0.93 0.41 2.08 0.94 0.71 0.95 0.9 1.07 1.52 0.97 
Variables definitions (All variables are expressed in percentage except for total assets, which is expressed in billion pesos) Loans: ratio of  net loans to total assets; Equity: 
ratio of equity to total assets; Deposits: ratio of total deposits to total assets; NII: ratio of non-interest income to total net operating income; FEE: ratio of fee-based income to 
total net operating income; BC: ratio of bank commissions and fees to total net operating income; SC: ratio of service charges to total net operating income; OC: ratio of other 
commissions and fees to total net operating income; TRAD: ratio of trading income to total net operating income; GS: ratio of income from trading government securities to 
total net operating income; PD: ratio of income from trading private debt/equity to total net operating income; FF: ratio of income from trading financial futures and other 
derivatives to total net operating income; PI: ratio of profit from sale of investments to total net operating income; FP: ratio of foreign exchange profit to total net operating 
income; Other: ratio of other non-interest income to total net operating income; ROA: return on average asset; ROE: return on average equity. 
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 Table 1B: Non-interest income components for Philippine universal and commercial banks over the 1999-2005 period (in %) 
 Whole sample Domestic banks Foreign banks Large banks Medium-sized banks Small banks Universal banks Commercial banks 
Fee-based activities 38 32.70 47.70 35.70 36.50 40.80 33.40 40.60 
Bank commissions 28.60 21.10 42.20 23.50 19.80 38.50 24.10 31 
Services charges 61.40 69.30 47.20 64.50 78.30 46.10 69.50 57.10 
Other commissions 10 9.60 10.60 12 1.90 15.40 6.40 11.90 
Trading activities 45.30 47.80 40.80 41.30 47.20 46 46 44.90 
Government securities  30.60 41.90 13.90 31.20 43.10 21.40 36.90 27.60 
Private debt/equity 8.10 8.20 7.90 9 6.20 9 9.90 7.20 
Financial futures 2.50 2.40 2.80 4.90 4 0.60 2.50 2.60 
Profit from sale of inv 7.30 11.80 0.70 16.40 10.90 1.40 12.70 4.80 
Foreign exchange profit 51.50 35.70 74.70 38.50 35.80 67.60 38 57.80 
Other 16.70 19.50 11.50 23 16.30 13.20 20.60 14.50 
Variables definitions: Fee-based activities: ratio of  fee-based income to non-interest income; Bank commission: ratio of bank commissions and fees to fee-based income ; 
Service charges: ratio of service charges to fee-based income; Other commissions: ratio of other commissions and fees to fee-based income; Trading activities: ratio of trading 
income to non-interest income; Government securities: ratio of income from trading government securities to trading income; Private debt/equity: ratio of income from 
trading private debt/equity to trading income; Financial futures: ratio of income from trading financial futures and other derivatives to trading income; Profit from sale of inv: 
ratio of profit from sale of investments to trading income; Other: ratio of other non-interest activities to non-interest income. 
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Table 2A.  Income diversification and profitability/risk for Philippine universal and commercial banks over the 1999-2005 period (H1) 
 Fixed Effects Panel Regression Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
     Two-step GMM S.E. Two-step GMM S.E. Two-step Robust S.E. Two-step Robust S.E. 
 ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA 
ROA (t-1)     0.345*** 0.315*** 0.371*** 0.316*** 0.345*** 0.315** 0.371*** 0.316* 
     (15.50) (4.79) (12.03) (4.49) (3.55) (2.20) (3.55) (1.69) 
FOCUS1 -0.006 -0.365   -0.022*** -4.630***   -0.0217** -4.630**   
 (-0.54) (-0.27)   (-4.47) (-4.55)   (-2.45) (-2.41)   
NII 0.017** 2.040*** 0.018*** 2.114*** 0.019*** 1.994*** 0.022*** 2.531*** 0.019** 1.994 0.022*** 2.531 
 (2.62) (3.55) (3.03) (3.52) (4.27) (2.97) (7.57) (4.55) (2.18) (1.43) (2.76) (1.58) 
ASSET 0.026** 2.814** 0.026** 2.847** -0.0071*** 1.094*** -0.005** 1.124*** -0.007 1.094 -0.005 1.124 
 
(2.30) 
 
(2.62) (2.33) (2.61) (-3.45) (2.87) (-2.56) (3.21) (-1.48) (1.34) (-1.07) (1.35) 
GROWTH -0.005*** -0.098 -0.005*** -0.103 -0.001 -0.661* -0.002 -0.654* -0.001 -0.661 -0.002 -0.654 
 (-3.28) (-0.94) (-3.32) (-1.05) (-0.53) (-1.68) (-0.92) (-1.65) (-0.16) (-0.57) (-0.30) (-0.52) 
EQUITY 0.034 5.612* 0.034 5.611* -0.031*** -2.624 -0.029*** -2.999* -0.031 -2.624 -0.029 -2.999 
 (0.92) (1.74) (0.93) (1.76) (-3.22) (-1.40) (-2.93) (-1.77) (-1.33) (-0.45) (-1.25) (-0.50) 
LOANS 0.025** 1.090 0.024** 1.064 -0.017*** -0.099 -0.021*** -0.763 -0.017* -0.099 -0.021** -0.763 
 (2.62) (1.48) (2.66) (1.52) (-8.34) (-0.16) (-10.45) (-1.08) (-1.93) (-0.06) (-2.57) (-0.39) 
GDP 0.024** 4.000*** 0.024** 4.007*** 0.015*** 1.447*** 0.015*** 1.599*** 0.015* 1.447 0.015* 1.599 
 (2.65) (4.25) (2.66) (4.30) (3.53) (2.64) (3.75) (2.67) (1.65) (1.02) (1.71) (0.99) 
Constant -0.449*** -57.15*** -0.459*** -57.77*** -0.002 -17.67*** -0.035 -21.57*** -0.002 -17.67 -0.035 -21.57 
 (-4.05) (-6.00) (-4.08) (-6.01) (-0.05) (-3.47) (-0.99) (-4.29) (-0.02) (-1.37) (-0.49) (-1.59) 
R2 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.26         
OBS 
Wald Test 
218 
5.32*** 
218 
6.63*** 
218 218 187 
34.73*** 
187 
52.59*** 
187 
 
187 
 
187 
15.60*** 
187 
26.17*** 
187 
 
187 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology for the fixed effects panel regression. Variable definitions: 
ROA: return on average assets; SHROA: ratio of return on average assets to standard deviation of ROA (annual data); FOCUS1= focus index based on a two part operating income breakdown- noninterest income and 
interest income; NII: ratio of non-interest income to total operating income; Asset: logarithm of total assets; Growth: average asset growth; Equity: ratio of equity to total assets; Loans: ratio of net loans to total assets; 
GDP: logarithm of the gross domestic product.   
 
 
Table 2B Estimated impact of a change in share of non-interest income on profitability and risk-adjusted profitability 
 
ROA 
  
SHROA 
 
 
Fixed Effect Two-Step Robust S.E. Fixed Effects Two-Step Robust S.E. 
NII Indirect  Net  Indirect  Net  Indirect  Net  Indirect  Net  
10th 0.007 0.024* 0.028** 0.046*** 0.463 2.503 5.88** 7.87*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (1.706) (1.72) (2.44) (1.74) 
25th 0.006 0.022** 0.021** 0.039*** 0.35 2.39* 4.42** 6.41*** 
 (0.01) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (1.28) (1.331) (1.83) (1.28) 
50th 0.004 0.02*** 0.0132** 0.032*** 0.23 2.270** 2.83** 4.82*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.846) (0.95) (1.17) (0.99) 
75th 0.001 0.018*** 0.005** 0.024*** 0.09 2.13*** 1.07*** 3.06*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.333) (0.619) (0.44) (1.12) 
90th -0.001 0.016** -0.007** 0.012 -0.059 1.981*** -1.50** 0.49 
 (0.001) 0.007 (0.003) (0.010) (0.216) (0.642) (0.62) (1.89) 
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Table 3A. Income diversification and profitability of Philippine universal and commercial 
banks over the 1999-2005 period: impact of differences in bank ownership type (H1a) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
following White’s methodology for the fixed effects panel regression. Variable definitions: ROA: return on average assets; 
SHROA: ratio of return on average assets to standard deviation of ROA (annual data); FOCUS1: focus index based on a two 
part operating income breakdown- non-interest income and interest income; NII: ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income; Asset: logarithm of total assets; Growth: average asset growth; Equity: ratio of equity to total assets; Loans: ratio of 
net loans to total assets; GDP: logarithm of the gross domestic product.  
 
 
Table 3B: Estimated  impact of an increased share in non-interest income: impact of 
differences in bank ownership type 
  DOMESTIC FOREIGN 
NII Percentiles 
SHROA ROA SHROA 
Indirect  Net  Indirect  Net  Indirect  Net  
10th 0.198 1.784 -0.086 -0.004 -5.688 -0.138 
 (2.063) (2.218) (0.091) (0.053) (5.45) (3.78) 
25th 0.149 1.734 -0.069 0.013 -4.558 0.993 
 (1.543) (1.728) (0.073) (0.036) (4.367) (2.797) 
50th 0.095 1.68 -0.046 0.036* -3.066 2.484 
 (0.988) (1.230) (0.049) (0.017) (2.938) (1.693) 
75th 0.041 1.626* -0.017 0.065** -1.099 4.452** 
 (0.426) (0.809) (0.018) (0.028) (1.053) (1.604) 
90th -0.055 1.53* 0.010 0.091 0.639 6.189** 
  (0.571) (0.826) (0.010) (0.053) (0.612) (2.868) 
 
 
 DOMESTIC BANKS FOREIGN BANKS 
 ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA 
FOCUS1 -0.001 -0.151   0.075 4.971   
 (-0.14) (-0.10)   (0.94) (1.04)   
NII 0.006 1.585** 0.006 1.606** 0.082* 5.550** 0.051*** 3.511*** 
 (1.43) (2.44) (1.41) (2.30) (1.87) (2.37) (2.95) (3.19) 
ASSET 0.012 2.121 0.012 2.139 0.045* 3.736** 0.042* 3.523** 
 (1.08) (1.49) (1.05) (1.47) (1.85) (2.37) (1.85) (2.23) 
GROWTH 0.005* 0.208 0.005* 0.208 -0.006*** -0.097 -0.006*** -0.057 
 (1.80) (0.55) (1.82) (0.55) (-5.46) (-0.88) (-5.49) (-0.52) 
EQUITY 0.021 5.351 0.021 5.355 0.107 10.43 0.090 9.316 
 (0.64) (1.34) (0.65) (1.35) (0.98) (1.36) (0.86) (1.23) 
LOANS -0.003 -0.676 -0.003 -0.690 0.025* 2.004* 0.030** 2.279** 
 (-0.20) (-0.51) (-0.22) (-0.56) (1.79) (1.99) (2.47) (2.31) 
GDP 0.015** 4.406*** 0.015** 4.409*** 0.027 2.565 0.028 2.629 
 (2.11) (4.05) (2.13) (4.11) (1.37) (1.41) (1.56) (1.50) 
Constant -0.229** -51.93*** -0.232** -52.23*** -0.732*** -61.21*** -0.653*** -55.95*** 
 (-2.53) (-4.18) (-2.34) (-4.07) (-3.13) (-4.45) (-3.16) (-4.59) 
R-square 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.55 0.40 0.53 0.39 
OBS 140 140 140 140 78 78 78 78 
Wald Test 1.04 2.98*   4.4** 3.99**   
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Table 4. Product mixes within non-interest activities and profitability/risk for Philippine universal and commercial banks over the 1999-2005 period 
(H2, model 2) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology for the fixed effects panel regression. Variable definitions: 
ROA: return on average assets; SHROA: ratio of return on average assets to standard deviation of ROA (annual data); FOCUS2: focus index based on a four-part operating income breakdown- fee based income, trading 
income and other non-interest income; FEE: ratio of fee-based income to total operating income; TRAD: ratio of trading income to total operating income; Other: ratio of other non-interest income to total operating 
income; Asset: logarithm of total assets; Growth: average asset growth; Equity: ratio of equity to total assets; Loans: ratio of net loans to total assets; GDP: logarithm of the gross domestic product.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Fixed Effects Panel Regression Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
     Two Step GMM S.E. Two Step Robust S.E. Two Step GMM S.E. Two Step Robust S.E. 
 ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA ROA SHROA 
ROA(t-1)     0.260*** 0.130*** 0.260** 0.132 0.3*** 0.188*** 0.25** 0.188* 
     (5.66) (2.74) (2.32) (1.31) (6.16) (3.28) (1.99) (1.70) 
FOCUS2 -0.004 -0.337   -0.014** -2.120*** -0.014 -2.123     
 (-0.26) (-0.19)   (-2.15) (-2.60) (-0.65) (-1.07)     
FEE 0.005 -0.441 0.008 -0.260 -0.023*** -2.599* -0.023 -2.599 -.01*** -2.157 -0.012 -2.157 
 (0.35) (-0.31) (0.63) (-0.26) (-4.11) (-1.82) (-0.99) (-0.85) (-3.64) (-1.53) (-0.72) (-0.76) 
TRAD 0.023 2.9*** .030*** 3.161*** 0.017*** 1.610*** 0.017 1.612 .02*** 2.148*** 0.02** 2.148** 
 (1.67) (2.80) (2.90) (4.80) (4.71) (3.03) (1.10) (1.02) (9.37) (5.47) (2.39) (2.03) 
Other -0.020 -2.025 -0.016 -1.724 -0.007 -4.970*** -0.007 -4.970 -0.0152 -5.06*** -0.015 -5.058 
 (-0.93) (-0.82) (-0.85) (-0.81) (-0.61) (-4.71) (-0.31) (-1.34) (-1.21) (-3.96) (-0.58) (-1.35) 
ASSET 0.02** 2.58** 0.03** 2.600** -0.008*** 1.550*** -0.008 1.553** -0.004 1.113*** -0.004 1.113 
 (2.49) (2.68) (2.52) (2.68) (-3.38) (4.14) (-1.57) (2.14) (-1.49) (4.06) (-0.67) (1.59) 
GROWTH -0.01*** -0.186* -.01*** -0.188* 0.0005 -0.7*** 0.0005 -0.695 -0.0023 -1.05*** -0.002 -1.053 
 (-3.77) (-1.79) (-3.78) (-1.85) (0.30) (-3.47) (0.09) (-1.60) (-1.35) (-4.28) (-0.37) (-1.52) 
EQUITY 0.023 4.636 0.023 4.623 -0.037*** -4.157** -0.037 -4.157 -.040*** -8.69*** -0.035 -8.70*** 
 (0.68) (1.46) (0.69) (1.48) (-4.50) (-2.13) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-5.62) (-5.73) (-1.30) (-2.66) 
LOANS 0.028** 1.140 0.030** 1.125 -0.016*** -0.044 -0.016* -0.044 -.020*** 0.062 -0.018* 0.062 
 (2.42) (1.45) (2.44) (1.49) (-6.38) (-0.10) (-1.76) (-0.03) (-6.49) (0.15) (-1.78) (0.04) 
GDP 0.029*** 4.6*** .030*** 4.561*** 0.024*** 3.09*** 0.024** 3.09** .02*** 2.976*** 0.02* 2.976** 
 (3.09) (4.49) (3.09) (4.55) (6.27) (5.26) (2.27) (2.15) (4.72) (4.86) (1.68) (2.17) 
Constant -0.46*** -58*** -0.500*** -58.6*** -0.046*** -33.90*** -0.046 -33.90*** -0.10*** -29.2*** -0.068 -29*** 
 (-4.42) (-6.66) (-4.43) (-6.76) (-3.16) (-7.39) (-0.61) (-2.87) (-5.99) (-10.20) (-0.92) (-3.43) 
R-square 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.34         
OBS 
Wald test 
Sargan test 
Test for autocorr 
M1:1st order 
M2:2nd 
orderPartial coeff: 
FeeBased 
Trading 
Other 
212 
3.77** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004 
0.022 
-0.020 
212 
8.64*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.531 
2.886* 
-2.064 
212 212 181 
180.15*** 
0.9 
 
0.03 
0.17 
 
-0.027*** 
0.013** 
-0.009 
181 
197*** 
0.9 
 
0.01 
0.79 
 
-3.170** 
0.894 
-5.229 
181 
12.77** 
 
 
0.05 
0.21 
 
-0.027 
0.013 
-0.009 
181 
32.1*** 
 
 
0.01 
0.69 
 
-3.170 
0.894 
-5.229 
181 
 
0.9 
 
0.03 
0.16 
181 
 
0.9 
 
0.01 
0.80 
181 
 
 
 
0.05 
0.21 
181 
 
 
 
0.02 
0.80 
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Table 5. Aggregate Data  on the Compliance with Micro, Small and Medium  Enterprises Credi t Required under  R.A. NO. 6977, as Amended 
by R.A.s Nos 8289 and 9501  of Universal and Commercial Banks (UKBs) in the Philippines from 1999 to 2005 (in million pesos) 
  
December 
2005  
December 
2004  
December 
2003  
December 
2002  
December 
2001  
December 
2000  
December 
1999  
MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES CREDIT (6% & 2%)               
Direct Compliance for MSMEs          154 275           163 204           163 304           183 486           184 862           180 951           174 959  
Alternative/Indirect Compliance for MSMEs            14 277             14 489             13 175             38 620               7 465               8 622             27 699  
Funds Set Aside for MSMEs             11 946             11 003             10 992               9 909               7 706               6 150               5 181  
Total Compliance for MSMEs          180 498           188 696           187 471           232 015           200 033           195 723           207 839  
Total Loan Portfolio Net of Exclusions          912 867           903 565           888 287           798 264           857 073           911 968           902 839  
Percentage of Compliance for MSMEs              19.77               20.88               21.10               29.06               23.34               21.46               23.02  
Percentage of Compliance for MSMEs (direct)              16.90               18.06               18.38               22.99               21.57               19.84               19.38  
Percentage of Compliance for MSMEs (alternative)                1.56                 1.60                 1.48                 4.84                 0.87                 0.95                 3.07  
MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES CREDIT (6%)               
Direct Compliance for MSEs            67 583             72 854             75 632           103 272           112 892             95 873           105 491  
Alternative/Indirect Compliance for MSEs              7 311               7 689               6 565             18 811               3 849               4 630             14 068  
Funds Set Aside for MSEs               9 444               8 451               8 323               7 518               5 971               4 681               4 040  
Total Compliance for MSEs            84 337             88 994             90 520           129 600           122 712           105 184           123 599  
Total Loan Portfolio Net of Exclusions          912 867           903 565           888 287           798 264           857 073           911 968           902 839  
Percentage of Compliance for MSEs                9.24                 9.85               10.19               16.24               14.32               11.53               13.69  
Percentage of Compliance for MSEs (direct)                7.40                 8.06                 8.51               12.94               13.17               10.51               11.68  
Percentage of Compliance for MSEs (alternative)                0.80                 0.85                 0.74                 2.36                 0.45                 0.51                 1.56  
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES CREDIT (2%)               
Direct Compliance for MEs            86 693             90 350             87 672             80 214             71 970             85 078             69 468  
Alternative/Indirect Compliance for MEs              6 966               6 800               6 610             19 810               3 616               3 992             13 631  
Funds Set Aside for MEs               2 503               2 552               2 669               2 392               1 735               1 469               1 141  
Total Compliance for MEs            96 161             99 702             96 950           102 415             77 321             90 539             84 240  
Total Loan Portfolio Net of Exclusions          912 867           903 565           888 287           798 264           857 073           911 968           902 839  
Percentage of Compliance for MEs              10.53               11.03               10.91               12.83                 9.02                 9.93                 9.33  
Percentage of Compliance for MEs (direct)                9.50               10.00                 9.87               10.05                 8.40                 9.33                 7.69  
Percentage of Compliance for MEs (alternative)                0.76                 0.75                 0.74                 2.48                 0.42                 0.44                 1.51  
 
 
 
 
 40 
 
Table 6A. The effect of income diversification on profitability and risk-adjusted profitability according to compliance with the mandated credit 
program, Magna Carta for Small Firms 
 Compliance to SME Lending (more than required)  
(Compliance>1.2%MinimumLegalLimit) 
Compliance to SME Lending (just what is required or less) 
(Compliance≤1.2%MinimumLegalLimit) 
 ROA SHROA ROA SHROA 
FOCUS1 0.009  1.301  -0.007  -1.553  
 (0.69)  (0.90)  (-0.37)  (-0.71)  
NII 0.011 0.011 0.811 0.788 0.021** 0.023** 2.744*** 3.105*** 
 (0.95) (0.90) (1.05) (0.87) (2.07) (2.53) (3.47) (3.76) 
ASSET 0.056 0.056 4.407** 4.346** 0.016 0.017 2.032 2.180 
 (1.78) (1.78) (2.68) (2.51) (1.45) (1.54) (1.45) (1.54) 
GROWTH -0.009 -0.010 -0.622 -0.718 -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.00003 -0.0281 
 (-1.12) (-1.20) (-0.81) (-0.95) (-3.80) (-4.05) (0.00) (-0.24) 
EQUITY 0.150 0.146 8.590 8.035 0.003 0.003 4.740 4.824 
 (1.40) (1.36) (1.41) (1.26) (0.06) (0.07) (1.15) (1.17) 
LOANS 0.012 0.012 -0.227 -0.202 0.019 0.019 1.689 1.533 
 (0.97) (0.97) (-0.24) (-0.21) (1.54) (1.57) (1.28) (1.25) 
GDP 0.043** 0.041** 5.366*** 5.058*** 0.020* 0.019* 4.102*** 4.033*** 
 (2.55) (2.87) (3.56) (3.73) (1.73) (1.76) (2.99) (2.92) 
Constant -0.919** -0.892** -83.78*** -80.14*** -0.306*** -0.316*** -49.16*** -51.21*** 
 (-2.67) (-2.65) (-6.38) (-5.93) (-3.24) (-3.17) (-4.11) (-4.21) 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.27 0.27 
OBS 68 68 68 68 142 142 142 142 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology for the fixed effects panel regression. Variable definitions: 
ROA: return on average assets; SHROA: ratio of return on average assets to standard deviation of ROA (annual data); FOCUS1: focus index based on a two part operating income breakdown- non-interest income and 
interest income; NII: ratio of non-interest income to total operating income; Asset: logarithm of total assets; Growth: average asset growth; Equity: ratio of equity to total assets; Loans: ratio of net loans to total assets; 
GDP: logarithm of the gross domestic product. MinimumLegalLimit=6%. 
 
Table 6B. Estimated impact of an increase in the share of non-interest income on profitability and risk-adjusted profitability 
  Compliance to SME Lending  Compliance to lending 
 
(more than required) (just what is required or less) 
  ROA SHROA ROA SHROA 
Mean 0,008 0.4191 0.0233** 3.1681*** 
 
(0.63) (0.42) (2.76) (4.22) 
25th 0.0055 0.0751 0.0244*** 3.4148*** 
 
(0.38) (0.06) (2.78) (3.70) 
50th 0.0073 0.3252 0.0235*** 3.2059*** 
 
(0.56) (0.31) (2.78) (4.17) 
75th 0.0102 0.7311 0.0223** 2.9664*** 
  (0.89) (0.91) (2.48) (4.18) 
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Table 7. Income diversification and profitability/risk for Philippine listed banks over the 1999-2005 period  (H1) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions: ROA= return on average assets; 
SHROA: ratio of return on average assets to standard deviation of ROA (annual data); Beta:  market model beta; TotRisk: total risk computed as the standard deviation of weekly returns; RiskSpec: specific risk or the 
standard deviation of the market model residual; MZ: Market Z-score; FOCUS1: focus index based on a two part operating income breakdown- non-interest income and interest income; NII: ratio of non-interest income to 
total operating income; Asset: logarithm of total assets; Growth: average asset growth; Equity: ratio of equity to total assets; Loans: ratio of net loans to total assets; GDP: logarithm of the gross domestic product. 
 LISTED BANKS UNIVERSAL LISTED BANKS 
 ROA SHROA Beta RiskSpec TotRisk MZ ROA SHROA Beta RiskSpec TotRisk MZ 
FOCUS1 -0.009 -1.628 0.0002 0.049 0.049 -104.8* -0.004 -0.413 -0.0001 0.007 0.006 -65.97 
 (-0.98) (-1.09) (0.14) (0.61) (0.60) (-1.97) (-0.41) (-0.23) (-0.17) (0.38) (0.34) (-1.22) 
NII 0.015** 3.029*** -0.001 -0.050 -0.051 133.1** 0.023*** 4.086*** -0.0006** -0.036*** -0.037*** 137.1** 
 (2.75) (3.77) (-1.30) (-0.77) (-0.77) (2.38) (4.35) (4.49) (-2.41) (-3.92) (-4.00) (3.10) 
ASSET 0.002 0.539 0.001 0.022 0.023 36.37 -0.0144 -1.987 0.0005 0.004 0.004 -29.05 
 (0.15) (0.29) (0.69) (0.21) (0.22) (0.44) (-0.97) (-1.13) (1.18) (0.44) (0.50) (-0.68) 
GROWTH 0.003 0.142 -0.001 -0.058 -0.059 0.758 -0.0001 0.0467 -0.00003 -0.007** -0.007** 14.52* 
 (0.93) (0.28) (-1.18) (-1.21) (-1.21) (0.04) (-0.02) (0.05) (-0.78) (-2.39) (-2.32) (2.21) 
EQUITY 0.032 8.077 -0.010** -0.773** -0.779** -331.4 0.040 3.486 0.004* 0.240** 0.244** -375.4* 
 (1.17) (1.49) (-2.19) (-2.55) (-2.54) (-1.58) (0.84) (0.35) (1.94) (2.32) (2.34) (-2.20) 
LOANS -0.007 -0.976 -0.0001 0.006 0.006 20.15 -0.031 -3.850** -0.0005 -0.018 -0.018 -78.95 
 (-0.46) (-0.59) (-0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.20) (-1.67) (-2.71) (-1.23) (-0.95) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
GDP 0.024** 5.849*** -0.002 -0.141 -0.143 125.3 0.042*** 8.686*** -0.0001 -0.024 -0.025 81.37 
 (2.40) (3.06) (-0.94) (-1.22) (-1.23) (1.60) (3.74) (7.70) (-0.69) (-1.17) (-1.20) (1.74) 
Constant -0.180* -44.7*** 0.003 0.870 0.873 -1160.9 -0.119 -35.05 -0.005 0.132 0.129 -106.7 
 (-2.06) (-3.40) (0.49) (1.33) (1.32) (-0.95) (-0.87) (-1.78) (-1.01) (0.93) (0.90) (-0.30) 
R-square 0.18 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.17 0.41 0.41 0.28 
OBS 
Wald Test 
Partial 
Effect of 
NII on 
Perf 
99 
4.64** 
 
 
0.019** 
99 
9.69*** 
 
 
3.78*** 
86 
1.62 
 
 
-0.001 
86 
.31 
 
 
-0.072 
86 
.32 
 
 
-0.073 
74 
3.65* 
 
 
180.7** 
72 
14.94*** 
 
 
0.024** 
72 
10.53*** 
 
 
4.28** 
64 
3.58* 
 
 
-0.001 
64 
10.16*** 
 
 
-0.039** 
64 
10.15*** 
 
 
-0.04** 
60 
4.83** 
 
 
163.02** 
 42 
 
Table 8. Product mixes within non-interest activities and profitability/risk for Philippine listed banks over the 1999-2005 period (H2, model 2a) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Variable definitions:  ROA: return on average assets; SHROA: ratio 
of return on average assets to standard deviation of ROA (annual data); Beta:  market model beta; TotRisk: total risk computed as the standard deviation of weekly returns; RiskSpec: specific risk computed as the standard 
deviation of the market model residual; MZ: Market Z-score; FOCUS2: focus index based on a four part operating income breakdown- fee-based income, trading income, other non-interest income, and interest income; FEE: 
ratio of fee-based income to total operating income; TRAD: ratio of trading income to total operating income; Other: ratio of other non-interest income to total operating income; Asset: logarithm of total assets; Growth: average 
asset growth; Equity: equity to total assets; Loans: ratio of net loans to total assets; GDP: logarithm of the gross domestic product.  
 LISTED BANKS UNIVERSAL LISTED BANKS 
 ROA SHROA Beta RiskSpec TotRisk MZ ROA SHROA Beta RiskSpec TotRisk MZ 
FOCUS2 -0.015 -1.458 0.001 0.151 0.152 -87.89 -0.006 1.877 0.0001 0.021 0.020 -28.41 
 (-1.16) (-0.62) (0.56) (1.23) (1.22) (-0.87) (-0.21) (0.58) (0.25) (0.99) (0.95) (-0.47) 
FEE 0.016 -3.390 0.002 0.179 0.180 -47.85 0.025 -1.702 -0.0004 -0.022 -0.023 -39.91 
 (0.34) (-0.52) (0.80) (0.78) (0.78) (-0.38) (0.77) (-0.38) (-0.61) (-1.05) (-1.10) (-0.56) 
TRAD 0.012 2.922 -0.001* -0.006 -0.007 110.0 0.025*** 6.215*** -0.001*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 153.9** 
 (1.62) (1.71) (-1.87) (-0.11) (-0.12) (1.22) (3.38) (5.53) (-5.33) (-3.79) (-3.92) (2.39) 
Other -0.027 -2.098 0.0006 0.104 0.104 34.00 -0.003 3.606 -0.0001 0.006 0.004 81.28 
 (-0.69) (-0.42) (0.61) (1.61) (1.59) (0.35) (-0.06) (0.89) (-0.23) (0.23) (0.17) (0.93) 
ASSET 0.004 0.777 0.001 0.032 0.033 38.14 -0.014 -2.140 0.0006 -0.001 -0.0003 -30.98 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.72) (0.26) (0.27) (0.44) (-0.86) (-1.04) (1.18) (-0.12) (-0.02) (-0.61) 
GROWTH 0.002 -0.103 -0.001 -0.054 -0.054 -1.371 -0.00002 -0.120 -0.00003 -0.006 -0.006 9.590 
 (0.64) (-0.19) (-1.17) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-0.07) (-0.00) (-0.12) (-0.68) (-1.67) (-1.63) (1.46) 
EQUITY 0.019 5.647 -0.009** -0.736** -0.742** -376.6* 0.038 4.572 0.004 0.234** 0.237** -406.7** 
 (0.66) (1.10) (-2.15) (-2.54) (-2.53) (-1.76) (0.71) (0.50) (1.80) (2.34) (2.36) (-2.63) 
LOANS -0.006 -1.260 0.00002 0.007 0.007 30.02 -0.034** -4.898*** -0.0004 -0.021 -0.020 -86.00 
 (-0.52) (-0.69) (0.02) (0.11) (0.12) (0.28) (-2.47) (-4.57) (-1.01) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-0.99) 
GDP 0.026* 5.379** -0.002 -0.143 -0.145 106.1 0.046** 8.394*** -0.0002 -0.020 -0.021 65.58 
 (1.96) (2.54) (-0.87) (-1.17) (-1.17) (1.74) (2.97) (4.82) (-0.83) (-1.00) (-1.04) (1.62) 
Constant -0.21** -42.64*** -0.001 0.679 0.679 -1028.9 -0.142 -31.76 -0.005 0.148 0.144 33.17 
 (-2.21) (-3.01) (-0.10) (0.89) (0.89) (-0.83) (-0.97) (-1.50) (-0.94) (1.13) (1.08) (0.09) 
R-square 0.24 0.37 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.44 0.437 0.317 
OBS 
Wald Test 
Partial Effect 
on Perf: 
FEE 
TRAD 
Other 
96 
4.36** 
 
 
0.013 
0.01 
-0.03 
96 
9.03*** 
 
 
-3.72 
2.35 
-2.32 
84 
1.86 
 
 
0.003 
-0.001 
0.001 
84 
1.96 
 
 
0.212 
0.053 
0.128 
84 
1.94 
 
 
0.214 
0.053 
0.128 
72 
3.01* 
 
 
-69.25 
74.33 
19.20 
70 
39.13*** 
 
 
0.023 
0.024* 
-0.004 
70 
15.96*** 
 
 
-1.24 
6.90*** 
3.92 
62 
9.68*** 
 
 
-0.000 
-0.001** 
-0.00 
62 
23.98*** 
 
 
-0.017 
-0.025 
0.009 
62 
24.26*** 
 
 
-0.018 
-0.027* 
0.008 
58 
13.71*** 
 
 
-46.94 
143.76 
76.54 
